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Uranium mill tailings are a fine sand-like residue that remains
after uranium is removed from raw uranium ore. These tailings emit
radon gas. Seepage from unlined tailings piles also can pollute
groundwater. In 1978, Congress passed the Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) to regulate the disposal and
reclamation of uranium mill tailings.' This study examines the
implemention of this legislation through eight case studies of urani-
um mills now being reclaimed. In the early 1990s, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) argued that delays in implementing this
legislation violated the intent of Congress.2 The eight cases exam-
ined here provide ample evidence that, indeed, this law has not been
implemented expeditiously. Whether or not this delay violated the
intent of Congress is a more difficult question that will be discussed
below.
Since the early years of its implementation, UMTRCA was
viewed as unjust and unnecessary by the uranium industry? The
eight case studies presented here will provide detail on the nature of
the environmental problems at each mill, as well as a regulatory
history. These case studies should allow a clearer judgement on the
questions of why reclamation is necessary and if the federal require-
ments for reclamation are just. The reclamation issue is complicated
by the changed financial fortunes of the uranium industry and by
the pre-law origins of some of the mill tailings and groundwater
problems that the uranium industry faces.
The eight case studies also provide a good basis for judging the
necessity, and fairness to taxpayers, of recent legislation which
authorizes the government to help pay for reclamation at some
private mills.4 This 1992 federal financial bailout might seem to
Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978) (Title I is codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7901 (1995). Title 11 is codified as amended in scattered sections of the
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1995)).
2 See Health and Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings,
58 Fed. Reg. 60,340, 60,342-43 (1993) [hereinafter Health Standards]. See also infra text
accompanying notes 110-112.
. See, e.g., Status of the Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry: Hearing
on the Effects of Imports Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-53 (1981)
(statement of George B. Rice, American Mining Congress, Uranium Environmental
Subcomm.); Management of Commingled Uranium Mill Tailings: Hearings Before the
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 498-529 (1982) (statements of George B. Rice and Jack
Vogt on behalf of the American Mining Congress) [hereinafter Commingled Tailings
Hearings]. This point is also made by several of the uranium companies examined in the
case studies which follow.
4 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 1001-1004, 106 Stat. 2776,
[VOL. 1 1: 1
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
confirm complaints by the uranium industry that UMTRCA imposes
an unfair financial burden on private industry.5 Today, the uranium
industry can also find some vindication for its long standing claim
that the danger of radon emissions from mill tailings has been great-
ly exaggerated. 6 Fifteen years of additional studies have not dis-
proved the industry's contention that radon from uncovered tailings
is a very minor public health threat.7
Initially, the major controversy between the uranium milling
industry and federal regulators was over requirements for covering
tailings once milling had stopped. The reason for the controversy
was obvious. The greatest cost in reclaiming a uranium mill is in
moving dirt. It is very expensive to recontour one hundred to two
hundred acres of tailings and then cover these tailings with five to
ten feet of earth, which in turn must be protected against erosion by
specially selected rock.'
A new area of contention appeared in the 1990s. This dispute
is over groundwater restoration. Compared to the costs of covering
tailings, the costs of pumping a polluted aquifer are relatively mi-
nor. The problem the uranium industry faces is that it is very diffi-
cult to clean up contaminated groundwater. In some instances, years
of pumping have only slightly reduced levels of contamination.9
Uranium companies have questioned whether the probable future
use of much of this groundwater really justifies the time and effort
required to clean it up.'0 Regulations allow for an easing of ground-
water clean-up standards in certain circumstances." Thus, many
companies now argue that, after a good faith effort, some of the
more intractable groundwater problems should be resolved by ad-
ministrative fiat.'
2
2946-48 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2296(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
See infra notes 68-72, 361-369 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Commingled Tailings Hearings, supra note 3, passim.
See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
A written protest from three companies over possible stricter cover requirements
in 1989 noted: "Every additional foot of cover that must be placed over a tailings
impoundment to reduce radon emissions represents many millions of dollars in costs to
the industry." Comments of Rio Algom Mining Corporation, Quivira Mining Company,
and Kerr-McGee Corporation in the Matter of National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants 72-73 (May 15, 1989) (on file with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-79-
11) [hereinafter Comments of Rio Algom, Quivira, and Kerr-McGee].
This is discussed in much greater detail in the case studies which follow.
HO E.g., infra note 253 and accompanying text.
On the regulations governing the granting of Alternate Concentration Limits, see
infra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
" The issue of Alternate Concentration Limits is discussed in detail in the case
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There are 19 private uranium mills licensed and supervised
directly by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Another
seven private mills are licensed by state governments in Texas,
Colorado, and Washington State.'3 All of these 26 mills have
stopped operations, and most are in various stages of reclamation.
The small number of private uranium mills and the wealth of detail
available on the federally regulated mills suggested that a case study
approach would be both possible and useful.'" The advantage of a
case study is that one can see how different variables such as physi-
cal setting and regulatory history affect reclamation. The disadvan-
tage is that the case studied may not be typical. This problem has
been dealt with by examining a large percentage of the total cases.
The eight cases examined here make up an important part of the
total reclamation picture in the uranium milling industry. A case
study approach would require far more justification if, for example,
one were studying reclamation at the nation's more than 2,400 coal
studies which follow.
" In 1959 Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to create the Agreement
State Program (Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). This act allowed states to
license and regulate uranium mills and/or, certain types of radioactive material. The
requirement that state standards for uranium mills be at least compatible with federal
standards was amended in 1978 by UMTRCA to require that state standards be "equiv-
alent, to the extent practicable, or more stringent than" those imposed by the NRC. 42
U.S.C. § 2021(o) (1988). See generally Elisa J. Grammer, The Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act of 1973 and NRC's Agreement State Program, 13 NAT. RESOURC-
ES LAW. 469, 500-22 (1981); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Uranium Mining and Milling in
Virginia: An Analysis of Regulatory Choice, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 81, 96-98,
101-09, 115-17 (1984).
Three states with uranium mills have chosen not to license these mills under the
Agreement State Program. The NRC licenses mills in Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico.
Wyoming and New Mexico were the two largest uranium producing states. New Mexico
did license uranium mills until 1986 when it returned its licensing authority to the NRC.
See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
" The NRC Public Document Room (NRC/PDR) is located at 2120 L Street N.W.
in Washington, D.C. Here one can find a complete and current regulatory record of each
of the 19 uranium mills licensed directly by the NRC. Unfortunately, the NRC does not
keep complete copies of state inspection reports and other documents on the seven mills
licensed by state governments. Presumably such records do exist in the files of the
relevant state agencies.
Most of the documents cited in the eight case studies used here are found in the
NRC/PDR. Paper copies of the documents may be examined and copied at the facility.
Documents also may be ordered by phone, fax, computer, or by writing to U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Public Document Room, Washington, D.C. 20555. Citations from
NRC documents will contain the accession number (ACN.) or the docket number (DKT.).
The accession number is a unique identification number for a document. A document
can also be located with the docket number (DKT.) and the date of the document.
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
mines.
In choosing cases an emphasis was given to on-going recla-
mation and unresolved reclamation problems. 5 Four mills were not
chosen because they had largely completed placing a permanent
cover over their tailings, although they still had groundwater resto-
ration work to do. Another mill, Plateau Resources' Shootaring
Canyon Mill in Utah, had operated for only a few months in 1982,
and had few tailings to reclaim.
The final choice was made from fourteen NRC regulated mills
where reclamation work is still in progress: seven in Wyoming; four
in New Mexico; three in Utah. From these fourteen mills, eight
cases were chosen, some of which had been the most important
uranium producers in the nation. Three of the four New Mexican
cases were chosen because of this state's leading role in uranium
production. Four cases were taken from Wyoming, and one from
Utah. The mill chosen in Utah had been the largest producer in the
state.
I. URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
Many of the large uranium mines operating in the western
United States in the 1970s contained uranium mills on the site as
part of their operation. 6 These mills converted ore from the mine
into uranium oxide, or yellowcake, which was then sent elsewhere
for enrichment into nuclear fuel. 17 At the mill, uranium ore was
crushed, blended, and ground to the proper size for a leaching pro-
" In choosing the case studies the seven state-regulated mills were not considered
because of a lack of easy access to regulatory reports.
" Uranium mines were both open pit and underground, depending on the depth of
the ore deposit. In Wyoming large open pit uranium mines were typical. Whereas, about
70% of New Mexico's uranium production came from underground mines. With some
exceptions, such as radon emissions from underground uranium mines, there is no federal
law governing reclamation of uranium mines. Uranium mine reclamation is primarily a
state responsibility. See John D. Collins, Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings Reclamation in
Wyoming-Ten Years After the Industry Collapsed, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 489
passim (1991) (discussing the overlap of state and Federal regulations and regulatory
activity in Wyoming).
" For general descriptions of uranium mining, milling and the nuclear fuel cycle,
see generally ANTHONY D. OWEN, THE ECONOMICS OF URANIUM 22-35 (1985);
Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 83-88; Peter C. Monson, Comment, Radioactive Air Pollu-
tion from Uranium Mining: Regulatory Abdication in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty,
13 ENVTL. L. 545, 546-560 (1983); David Riccitiello, Uranium Mining and Milling: A
Primer, 4 WORKBOOK 222 (1979); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR
RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF URANIUM MILL TAILINGS 11-13, 22-34, 54-58
(1986) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
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cess that would extract the uranium. A ton of uranium ore would
produce only one to five pounds of uranium oxide, leaving essen-
tially a ton of residue. This residue, especially in its dried, sand-like
form, is referred to as mill tailings.
After processing, a liquid residue remained that might typically
contain 40% solids and 60% liquid. 8 This solution contained sands
and slimes (coarse and fine tailings), plus water and chemicals used
to leach the uranium from the ore. This liquid slurry would then be
pumped to a tailings impoundment. Later, some of the slurry water
might be pumped back to the mill for re-use. As tailings impound-
ments were seldom lined, the liquid which remained in these im-
poundments would either evaporate or seep into the ground and any
groundwater beneath. Although most of the uranium is removed
from the ore in the milling process, the tailings residue contains
much of the radioactivity of the original ore. This radioactivity
comes from unextracted uranium, radium-226, thorium-230, and
other trace metals. These radionuclides are found in tailings at hun-
dreds of times the normal level in soil.19 Non-radioactive but po-
tentially water polluting contaminants also are commonly found in
tailings. These contaminants may include arsenic, molybdenum,
lead, selenium, chloride, manganese, and sulfates.20
A. The Radon Threat from Uranium Mill Tailings
The potential radiation danger from uranium mining and mill-
ing is from radon. Of the three radon isotopes, radon-222 is the
biggest threat to public health.2' Radon-222 is an odorless and col-
orless radioactive gas produced when uranium decays. Uranium and
its decay products are found widely throughout the world. Ordinari-
ly, most radon-222 is generated below the surface and decays into
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 29.
Riccitiello, supra note 17, at 227; MERRIL EISENBUD, ENVIRONMENTAL RADIO-
ACTIVITY 177 (3d ed. 1987).
' Riccitiello, supra note 17, at 227; Environmental Standards for Uranium and
Thorium Mill Tailings at Licensed Commercial Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,926,
45,928 (1983) [hereinafter Standards Licensed Sites].
"J Atoms of the element radon have 86 protons. There are only three known
isotopes of radon. Radon-219 (actinon) and radon-220 (thoron) have extremely short half-
lives which means that concentrations of these isotopes are very low and there is less
danger of human exposure from their decay products. COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL
EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATIONS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS OF
RADON AND OTHER INTERNALLY DEPOSITED ALPHA-EMrITERS, BEIR IV 24-25 (1988)
[hereinafter BEIR IV].
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nongaseous radionuclides before it can migrate through the soil and
enter the atmosphere.22 However, mining and milling of uranium
ore removes the protective shield of earth and rock and produces a
concentrated source of radioactivity above ground in the form of
uranium ore and uranium mill tailings.
Radon-222 has a half-life of 3.8 days. If it is released into the
atmosphere, either naturally or through mining and milling, some
atoms of gaseous radon-222 can travel hundreds of miles before
they decay into non-radioactive lead.24 Once in the atmosphere, the
decay products, or daughters, of radon-222 can attach to microscop-
ic dust particles. When inhaled, these small particles may stick to
the moist epithelial lining of the bronchi. Before being cleared from
the bronchi by mucus, they can expose several types of lung cells to
alpha radiation and increase the risk of lung cancer.25
Numerous studies of underground miners exposed to radon
daughters in the air of mines have shown an increased risk of lung
cancer in comparison with non-exposed populations.26 Abundant
epidemiological and experimental data have established the carcino-
genicity of radon's decay products. However, the risk to health from
radon in environments with lower concentrations than underground
uranium mines has not been adequately quantified and, in the mid-
1990s, remains a subject of intense interest and debate.27
22 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL
RULE FOR RADON-222 EMISSIONS FROM LICENSED URANIUM MILL TAILINGS at 2-2, 3-6
(Background Information Document, Aug. 1986).
23 Id. at 3-1 to 3-6.
" Id. at 2-2. The radon-222 decay process involves seven principal decay products
before the radon-222 becomes nonradioactive lead-206.
2 BEIR IV, supra note 21, at 27, 28; Rhonda S. Berger, The Carcinogenicity of
Radon, 24 ENV'T. SCI. & TECH. 30, 30-31 (1990). The ray or particle emitted by a
radionuclide is typically an alpha particle, a beta particle, or a gamma ray. Gamma rays
are the most penetrating and tend to be the most hazardous when the source of radiation
is outside the body. It may require lead or concrete to stop them. Alpha particles, on
the other hand, cannot even penetrate the skin, and can be stopped by a thin piece of
paper. Once an alpha-emitting source is inhaled or ingested, however, it is extremely
damaging for the short distance it does travel. Alpha particles are high "linear energy
transfer" (high-let) radiation. SCOTr SALESKA, NUCLEAR LEGACY at 11-3 (Public Citizen,
Critical Mass Energy Project, Sept. 1989).
26 E.g., Jonathan M. Samet & Richard W. Homung, Review of Radon and Lung
Cancer Risk, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 65 (1990); Jay H. Lubin et al., Lung Cancer in Radon-
Exposed Miners and Estimation of Risk from Indoor Exposure, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER
INST. 817 (1995). Laboratory animals exposed to radon daughters also develop lung
cancer. BEIR IV, supra note 21, at 5, 24, 29; David J. Hanson, Radon Tagged as
Cancer Hazard by Most Studies, Researchers, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, Feb. 6, 1989, at 7,
8-9.
27 Jonathan M. Samet, Indoor Radon and Lung Cancer: Risky or Not? 86 J. NAT'L
1995-961
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The subject holds great interest because naturally occurring
radon is found in elevated concentrations in many indoor environ-
ments.8 Questions about the risk from exposure to low levels of
radiation, and how to quantify such risks, also lie at the heart of the
political debate over the dangers of nuclear power and nuclear
waste.29
Extrapolations based on cancer rates for underground miners
have been used to project the risk of lung cancer associated with
indoor radon for the general population. The resulting risk projec-
tions have been startlingly large. These projections estimate around
15,000 lung cancer deaths per year because of radon exposure.30
Such extrapolations, however, involve numerous assumptions which
are extremely difficult to prove or disprove."
CANCER INST. 1813 (1994) (discussing the major issues and methodological problems in
the debate).
Radon concentrations in an underground uranium mine might be five hundred to
several thousand picocuries per liter (pCi/L) of air, or higher. 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION
PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
NESHAPS RADIONUCLIDES at 11-5 to 11-Il (Sept. 1989); RAYE C. RINGHOLZ, URANIUM
FRENZY 92-94, 169 (1989) (a picocurie is a trillionth of one curie, which is a measure
of the rate of radioactive decay). U.S. houses, by comparison, contain an average radon
concentation of I pCi/L, although concentrations vary widely. The EPA has suggested
that remedial action be taken for indoor concentrations above 4 pCi/L. The mean con-
centrations among states in the United States range from less than 1 pCi/L to more than
8 pCi/L, although less than 1% of homes exceed 8 pCi/L. Lubin et al., supra note 26,
at 818.
A concentration of I pCi/L in a home would result in an estimated annual
exposure of 1.5 rems to the bronchial epithelium. HENRY N. WAGNER & LINDA E.
KETCHUM, LIVING WITH RADIATION 138 (1989). One study of uranium miners showed
that they had been exposed to 40 rems per year for an average of ten years. Id. Rads
and reins are used to measure radiation exposure. A rad is equal to 100 ergs of radia-
tion energy absorbed per gram of matter. A rem is obtained by multiplying the exposure
in rads by the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of the radiation in question.
SALESKA, supra note 25, at Il-1.
" J. Samuel Walker, The Controversy Over Radiation Safety, 262 JAMA 664
(1989); WAGNER & KETCHUM, supra note 28, at 40-44, 155-165.
' Lubin et al., supra note 26, at 823-24; Samet, supra note 27, at 1813; WAGNER
& KETCHUM, supra note 28, at 139-40. Extrapolations based on known cancer deaths for
underground miners lead to projections of about five fatal cancer deaths per year from
licensed uranium mill tailings piles. OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 22, at
6-9. See also EISENBUD, supra note 19, at 178.
"' These extrapolations usually are based on some variation of the no-threshold
linear hypothesis. WAGNER & KETCHUM, supra note 28, at 41-42, 158-160; RICHARD
WOLFSON, NUCLEAR CHOICES 70-73 (1991); SALESKA, supra note 25, at 11-3 to 11-5.
This hypothesis would assume that, no matter how low the radiation exposure, there is
an additional risk of cancer that accompanies any increased exposure. It also assumes
that the excess risk is proportional to any dose. WAGNER & KETCHUM, supra note 28,
at 158-59. If these assumptions were true then the same number of radiation caused
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Beginning in the 1980s, a number of case studies were initiated
to measure the risk from indoor radon directly and avoid the uncer-
tainties involved in projections based on studies of uranium miners.
One of the most recent of these studies took place in Missouri.32
This study took radon measurements for a year in homes of 538
non-smoking white women diagnosed with lung cancer. These were
compared to radon measurements in the homes of 1,183 matched
subjects, also living in Missouri, who did not have lung cancer. The
findings from this and several other similar studies showed no statis-
tical significance for associations between indoor radon and lung
cancer.33 Some other studies have shown contradictory results.34
The authors of the Missouri study concluded that the magnitude of
the lung cancer risk from radon levels commonly found in U.S.
dwellings appears low. 35
This research and the current debate over the dangers of indoor
radon have direct implications for assessing the radon danger posed
by uncovered uranium mill tailings. Radon emissions from uncov-
ered mill tailings piles are approximately at the same level that one
would find in an underground uranium mine.36 Both an under-
ground mine and a mill tailings impoundment are concentrated
source of radon emissions. However, the typical uranium mill tail-
cancers would occur among 100,000 people receiving 100 rems as among 100,000,000
people receiving 0.1 rem. Id. at 41.
In the particular case of uranium miners, these extrapolations also assume that the
environment in a uranium mine is similar to that in a home. This may not be so as
uranium miners were mainly men, not women or children. Most of these men smoked
and worked in a dusty environment which in addition to radon daughters also exposed
them to silica, arsenic, diesel exhaust and blasting fumes. Samet, supra 27, at 1813;
Michael C.R. Alavanja et al., Residential Radon Exposure and Lung Cancer Among
Nonsmoking Women, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1829, 1829 (1994).
'2 Alvanja et al., supra note 31.
3 No link between lung cancer and indoor radon was found in past studies in
China, Finland and Canada. Id. at 1830. A combined analysis of studies in China,
Stockholm, Sweden, and New Jersey revealed no evidence of a radon related risk,
despite nearly 1000 lung cancer cases available for analysis. Id.
14 A slight increase in lung cancer related to increased radon levels was suggested
in studies in New Jersey and in Stockholm, Sweden. Id. A strong correlation was
reported in a national Swedish study. Goran Pershagen et al., Residential Radon EXpo-
sure and Lung Cancer in Sweden, 330 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 159 (1994). One major
problem with all these case studies is sample size. Thousands of subjects would be
required under realistic scenarios of measurement error and population mobility. Samet,
supra note 27, at 1813; WAGNER & KETCHUM, supra note 28, at 159.
3 Alvanja et al., supra note 31, at 1829.
36 1 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUC. REG.
COMM., DRAFT GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON URANIUM MILLING at
5 (April 1979) [hereinafter DRAFT GENERIC E.I.S.].
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ings pile is not emitting radon into an enclosed environment, as is
the case in an underground uranium mine. Radon from an open air
tailings pile is quickly dispersed into the atmosphere. Depending on
the distance from the tailings pile, radon concentrations are less than
what one would find in many homes. Indeed, within a mile or less,
radon concentrations usually fall to natural, outdoor background
levels.37
From the perspective of the mid-i990s, then, there appears to
be no new evidence that would disprove the uranium industry's
contention that the radon danger from isolated uranium mill tailings
piles represents very little threat to the public health.3" Of course,
not all uranium mill tailings piles are isolated. As we shall see in
the case studies which follow, some tailings piles are located in or
near population centers. Also, up until the mid-1960s, when the
awareness about radon's dangers became more widespread, uranium
mill tailings were commonly used as a cheap fill to replace sand in
construction projects.39 In such cases, radon from tailings piles
could definitely accumulate in enclosed spaces. Some buildings in
Colorado where tailings had been used in construction had radon
concentrations close to the level that would trigger evacuation in a
uranium mine, and hundreds of times the recommended safe level.'
II. CONGRESS AcTS TO REGULATE URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
The initial effort by Congress to address the uranium mill
tailings problem came in 1971 when hearings were held on the use
of mill tailings in construction projects.4' These hearings led to
legislation which created a cooperative program with Colorado to
clean up structures that had been built using mill tailings in the
3' EISENBAUD, supra note 19, at 177; U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra
note 22, at 3-4. See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 2, 45-54.
3' Examples of the uranium industry's view that the threat of radon has been
greatly exaggerated are found in Commingled Tailings Hearings, supra note 6, passim;
Comments of Rio Algom, Quivira, and Kerr-McGee, supra note 8, passim.
39 H. PETER METZGER, THE ATOMIC ESTABLISHMENT 193 (1972); Grammer, supra
note 13, at 478-79. The worst example occurred in Grand Junction, Colorado, where
between 1952 and 1966 one uranium company donated some 200,000 tons of uranium
mill tailings for use as fill material in building roads, sewers and foundations for homes
and offices. METZGER, supra at 171-76.
'o WOLFSON, supra note 31, at 217; See also METZGER, supra note 39, at 176.
" Use of Uranium Mill Tailings for Construction Purposes: Hearings Before the
Raw Materials Subcommittee of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
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Grand Junction area." Grand Junction was the worst site of such
contamination.
This first attempt by Congress to deal with the problems caused
by uranium milling left two major tailings related problems unre-
solved. One problem was how to safely dispose of the 23 million
metric tons of uranium mill tailings found at abandoned or inactive
mill sites throughout the West.4 3 The second problem was how to
prevent this scenario from being repeated in the future. This prob-
lem was especially pressing in the mid-1970s, as a new uranium
boom was underway.
A. Uranium Booms
The first uranium boom in the western U.S. took place in the
1950s. It started when government buying stations opened to en-
courage exploration and assure uranium supplies for the defense
industry. These buying stations guaranteed purchase of all uranium
produced, and the price offered assured a generous profit." This
boom ended in the late 1950s when the government announced that
there would be no price increases through the mid-1960s and that it
would not buy uranium from domestic reserves developed after 1958."5
This period of government uranium purchases left 23 million
metric tons of unreclaimed uranium mill tailings at some 20 defunct
or abandoned uranium mills scattered throughout the West.* An-
other 55 million metric tons of tailings, that had also been produced
under government contract were stored at mills that continued to
operate through the lean years of the 1960s.'
42 Pub. L. No. 92-314, 86 Stat. 222 (1972). See generally Charles H. Montange,
Federal Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309, 338 (1987); H.R.
REP. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at I1, 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7433, 7434 (House Report 1480, parts I and 2, provides the basic legisla-
tive history for UMTRCA. There was no conference report).
43 I DRAFT GENERIC E.1.S., supra note 36, at 2-2, 2-3; see also H.R. REP. No.
1480, supra note 42, pt. 2, at 29-32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7456-7459.
See OWEN, supra note 17, at 38. See generally Michael A. Amundson, Home on
the Range No More, 26 W. HIST. Q. 483, 484-87 (1995) (addressing the first uranium
boom).
" OWEN, supra note 17, at 38-39; RINGHOLZ, supra note 28, at 208. At this same
time new uranium discoveries were being made in Wyoming and New Mexico which
added to government worries about excessive supplies of uranium. See generally id. at
179-83, 208; Amundson, supra note 44, at 487-88 (regarding the end of the first urani-
um boom).
' DRAFT GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 36, at 2-2, 2-3. The one abandoned uranium
mill tailings site in the east was in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.
17 Uranium Mill Tailings Reclamation Act of 1985: Joint Hearing on HR. 2236
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As the transition to a private market was slow and difficult,
some government purchasing of uranium continued until 1970.'
The private-market demand came from the new nuclear power in-
dustry. Growth in new reactor orders was slowed in the late 1960s
by organized public resistance to nuclear power,4 9 and in the early
1970s by high energy prices which stifled the demand for electrici-
ty.
50
It was not until the mid-1970s that uranium prices took off and
a second uranium boom began. Uranium oxide (yellowcake) sold for
$6.41 a pound in 1973, $23.68 a pound in 1975, and for $43.23 a
pound in 1978."' By 1978 there were 21 uranium mills operating in
six western states.52 Some of these mills announced expansion
plans." Several companies were planning or constructing new
mills. Eleven new mills were planned to start up in the late 1970s or
early 1980s." Such future milling activity promised to add millions
of tons of tailings to the estimated 130 million metric tons accumu-
lated by the late 1970s as a result of past milling for both the gov-
ernment and the private market.55
and S. 1004 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environ. of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs and the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1985)
[hereinafter Joint Hearing].
' OwEN, supra note 17, at 39; Amundson, supra note 44, at 491-92.
'9 See LUTHER J. CARTER, NUCLEAR IMPERATIVES AND PUBLIC TRUST 78-89
(1987)
50 JOHN E. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
ENERGY 96 (1983).
5' OWEN, supra note 17, at 42.
52 DRAFT GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 36, at 3-3. One site in Florida extracted
uranium as a by-product in the production of phosphoric acid for fertilizer. There were
also five solution mining, or in-situ, operations producing uranium in Texas in 1978.
These operations inject a leach solution into a subterranean uranium bearing ore body to
dissolve and then extract the uranium. This process greatly reduces the residue that is
produced in the traditional mining and milling process. Id. at 3-9, 3-11.
" Id. at 3-14.
4 Id.
" Id. at 2-2. This would be about 140 million short tons (I metric ton = 1.102
short tons - 2000 lbs). In 1978 about 80% of this total tailings accumulation was found
at active mills that were then producing uranium and were licensed by the NRC. The
rest of the tailings were stored at mills that had quit operating and whose licenses had
expired. Such mills were often referred to as inactive or abandoned mill sites. Id.
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B. A Federal Clean-up of Abandoned and Inactive Tailings
In 1974, a congressional committee proposed that the federal
government join with the State of Utah to plan reclamation of the
Vitro uranium mill tailings site in Salt Lake City.5 6 Both the EPA
and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) endorsed this idea but sug-
gested, instead, a comprehensive study of all abandoned and inactive
uranium mill tailings sites found in the U.S.57 This study became
the basis for legislation authorizing a massive federal program to
reclaim some 20 abandoned or inactive uranium mill tailings sites.
This legislation was enacted in 1978 as Title I of the Uranium Mill-
ing Tailings Radiation Control Act.5"
C. New Federal Legislation for Operating Mills
The final tailings related problem facing Congress in the early
1970s was how to ensure safe disposal of tailings being produced at
operating mills. The key to resolution already existed. It was the
AEC (later NRC) license that each uranium mill had to have to
operate.59 In the 1970s this licensing authority was used to gradu-
" I OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR REMEDIAL ACTION STANDARDS FOR INACTIVE
URANIUM PROCESSING SITES at 5-7 (Oct. 1982).
I' d. at 5; Montange, supra note 42, at 339.
Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978) (Title I is codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7901). See generally Grammer, supra note 13, at 481-88. Title I of UMTRCA
specifically designated some twenty inactive uranium mill tailings sites to be reclaimed
by the Department of Energy in cooperation with state governments. These sites con-
tained a total of about 23 million metric tons of tailings, all of which were produced
under contract to the federal government. Ninety percent of reclamation costs were to be
paid for by the federal government and ten percent by the states in which the sites were
located. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7911-7913, 7917. On Title I see also H.R. REP. NO. 1480, supra
note 42, pt. 1, at 13, 18-19, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7435, 7440-41, and pt. 2,
at 30-32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7457-59.
Title I of UMTRCA also provided that nearby property contaminated with residual
radioactive materials from the processing site could be designated for remedial action. 42
U.S.C. § 7912(e)(1). It is estimated that when completed in 1996 the reclamation of
Title I inactive mill tailings sites will have cost tax payers $1.4 billion. This cost does
not include cleaning up contaminated groundwater which will be undertaken as a separate
project. Paul Kemezis, Mill Tailings Cleanup Progresses, ENR, July 29, 1991, at 23. See
also UMTRA PROJECT OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE URANIUM MILL TAILINGS REMEDIAL ACTION
GROUND WATER PROJECT (April 1995). The Department of Energy, Office of Envi-
ronmental Restoration and Waste Management produces an ANNUAL STATUS REPORT ON
TiE URANIUM MILL TAILINGS REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM.
'9 See generally Blair P. Bremberg, Financial Responsibility Requirements and the
Implementation of Environmental Policy: The Case of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radia-
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
ally incorporate new requirements into company licenses to ensure
that mill tailings were disposed of in a safe and environmentally
sound manner.' The legal basis for such action had been greatly
expanded in 1970 with the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). 6' The stimulus for this new concern with the
environment came largely from the legal actions of environmental
groups trying to force the AEC to implement NEPA.62
When Congress acted in 1978 to deal with the problem of
tailings at abandoned and inactive mill sites it was recognized that
the tailings problem at operating mills had largely been resolved.63
Nevertheless, to "clarify" and "reinforce" the NRC's authority over
the production and disposal of tailings at operating mills, Congress
added Title II to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act.64
In UMTRCA, Title II, the EPA was designated to write the
general standards that would govern reclamation at operating urani-
um mills. 65 NRC would then write specific rules and apply them to
individual mills through the issuing and amending of licenses.' It
was generally understood, however, that reclamation standards for
operating uranium mills would follow guidelines that NRC had been
developing since the early 1970s.f One of the most controversial
tion Control Act, 8 J. ENvTL. L. 171, 174-83 (1989).
6' See H.R. REP. NO. 1480, supra note 42, pt. 1, at 12, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7434; Montange, supra note 42, at 337-40.
63 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, §§ 101, 102,
83 Stat. 852, 852-54 (1970). See also Montange, supra note 42, at 338.
61 Montange, supra note 42, at 339; H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 42, pt. 1, at
12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7434.
63 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 42, pt. 2, at 30, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7457.
Id. pt. 1, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7435, 7438. See also id. pt. 2,
at 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7456. Title 11 of UMTRCA added uranium mill
tailings to the definition of byproduct materials and thus made uranium mill tailings a
material that was licensable by the NRC. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1988).
- 42 U.S.C. § 2022 (1988).
66 42 U.S.C. § 2114 (1988). This division of authority followed a pattern devel-
oped in the early 1970s to assuage concern over the dual role played by the AEC,
NRC's predecessor. The AEC had acted as both the promoter and regulator of nuclear
energy. Richard Goldsmith, Nuclear Power Meets the 101st Congress, A "One-Act"
Comedy: Regulation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensees Under the Clean Air
Act, 12 VA. ENvTL L.J. 103, 103-06 (1992).
67 See H.R. REP. NO. 1480, supra note 42, pt. 1, at 12, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7434, 7435. See generally John Magee, Comment, The Uranium Mill
Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 801, 805-06 (1980). Some
parts of UMTRCA, Title II, did contain a new emphasis. Grammer stresses the increased
federal control over the Agreement States that were authorized to license uranium mills.
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aspects of UMTRCA, Title II, was the decision by Congress that
private companies would have to pay for reclaiming all of the tail-
ings stored at their mills, including the 55 million metric tons pro-
duced under government contract prior to 1970.' The legislative
history of UMTRCA makes clear that Congress did not want its
willingness to pay for reclamation at Title I, unlicensed (abandoned
and inactive), uranium mill sites taken as a precedent for other
federally financed clean-ups.' The House reports on UMTRCA
emphasized that the issue of Title I sites was a unique case. After
milling had stopped, these unlicensed sites escaped governmental
control because at the time the hazards of tailings were not under-
stood.7' This "loophole in the law," it was argued, clearly did not
exist at operating mill tailings sites. 71 "Those sites, even those with
tailings derived from federal contracts, are subject to NRC regula-
tion as a result of the enactment of NEPA in 1970."
7
1
D. The Regulations Implementing UMTRCA, Title II
In the late 1970s, the NRC had been working on a generic
environmental impact statement on uranium milling.7 Thus, the
Agency was able to produce the rules implementing UMTRCA by
1980."4 This was well before EPA produced its general standards
and before the new Republican Administration and the Republican
Grammer, supra note 13, at 506-20. Bremberg states that: "The hallmark of UMTRCA is
the financial responsibility requirement. . . .[which] requires mill licensees to post
financial sureties to ensure performance of approved decommissioning and reclamation
plans." Bremberg, supra note 59, at 173.
42 U.S.C. § 7925 (1988). See also REP. H.R. No. 1480, supra note 42, pt. 2,
at 30, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7457; COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, CLEANING UP COMMINGLED URANIUM MILL TAILINGS: IS FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE NECESSARY? (Feb. 5, 1979) (recommending financial assistance to active mill
operators for cleaning up tailings produced under Federal contract).
69 H.R. REP. NO. 1480, supra note 42, pt. 2, at 28, 30, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7455, 7457.
70 Id. pt 2, at 30, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7457.
71 Id.
72 id.
7' DRAFT GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 36; OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY
AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUC. REG. COMM., FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ON URANIUM MILLING (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter FINAL GENERIC E.I.S.].
74 Uranium Mill Licensing Requirements, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,015 (1979) (proposed
Aug. 24, 1979); Uranium Mill Licensing Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,521 (1980)
(final rules) (codified at 10 C.F.R. §§ 30, 40, 70, 150). NRC discusses the process for
developing regulations and gives its justification for issuing regulations as soon as
possible in 45 Fed. Reg. 65,521, 65,523 (1980).
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Senate came to power in 1981. As soon as the NRC rules appeared,
they were challenged in court by Kerr-McGee and several other
uranium companies."
The legal challenge to the new regulations failed, but efforts by
the uranium industry to get Congress to intervene were more suc-
cessful. In 1982, Congress amended an appropriations bill to forbid
the NRC from any spending to implement the mill tailings regula-
tions.76 In January 1983, however, new legislation restored the
NRC's authority." EPA issued final standards in October 1983,
more than three years after the original Congressional deadline.
Both environmental groups and industry appealed, but the standards
were upheld in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.7 9 Where neces-
sary, the NRC changed its existing rules to conform to the new EPA
general standards.80
The regulatory emphasis implementing UMTRCA was on new
mills. This proved to be a mistake because few of the planned mills
ever opened. Most of those that did open had ceased operations by
the early 1980s."' The "general goal" or "broad objective" of the
" Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. N.R.C., [1982] 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1537
(Mar. 23, 1982). The companies in this case argued the regulations were too stringent
and expensive given the slight risks from radon emissions. The petitioners also asserted
that the NRC had usurped the authority of the EPA by issuing regulations to implement
UMTRCA before the general standards appeared. Montange, supra note 42, at 345. On
the complex political and legal machinations surrounding these NRC regulations, see
Elizabeth V. Scott, Note, Unfinished Business: The Regulation of Uranium Mining and
Milling, 18 U. RtCH. L. REV. 615, 629-30 (1984); Montange, supra note 42, at 344-48.
76 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-88,
tit. IV, 95 Stat. 1135, 1147-48 (1981). See also Scott, supra note 75, at 629; Montange,
supra note 42, at 345.
" Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appropriations Authorization, Pub. L. No. 97-
415, 96 Stat. 2067, 2077-78 (1983).
" Standards Licensed Sites, supra note 20. These standards are codified at 40
C.F.R. § 192, subpts. D & E (1983).
" American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 479 U.S. 814 (1986). The EPA had also promulgated general standards for the
Title I, inactive mills that were to be reclaimed by the Department of Energy. The court
did not uphold the groundwater standard for the Title I sites and ruled that EPA must
issue groundwater standards for inactive sites rather than proceed on a case-by-case basis.
See Health Standards, supra note 2. American Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d
617 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 426 U.S. 1158 (1986).
" Uranium Mill Tailings Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,852 (1985), and Uranium
Mill Tailings Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,553 (1987). These NRC regulations are
codified at 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A (1987). In Quivira Mining Co. v. N.R.C., 866 F.2d
1246 (10th Cir. 1990) the court upheld NRC's 1985 rule changes. A new challenge to
NRC's 1987 rules also failed. American Mining Congress v. N.R.C., 902 F.2d 781 (10th
Cir. 1990). See generally Health Standards, supra note 2, at 60,341, 60,344-45.
" See infra text accompanying notes 114-119.
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regulations was to avoid future environmental problems through a
wise choice of isolated sites for new tailings impoundments and
through new designs."2 Below grade tailings impoundments would
be one example of a new design which eliminated the need for
retention structures that might fail. 3 New tailings impoundments
would also be lined to prevent seepage.84
The final reclamation of a tailings impoundment involved dry-
ing the tailings and then covering them to prevent infiltration or
dispersal by rain, wind, snow, or flood. The permanent earthen
cover had to be of sufficient depth so that radon emissions from the
reclaimed tailings would not exceed twenty picocuries per square
meter per second (20 pCi/m2/s).85 The cover had to be of sufficient
strength to keep the tailings undisturbed for at least 200 years, and
longer if this could be reasonably achieved.86 Long-term protection
would be supplied by a self sustaining vegetative or rock cover over
the earthen cover.87 Erosion from water runoff would be minimized
by contouring the dried tailings to reduce steep slopes. 8 "In addi-
tion to rock cover on slopes, areas toward which surface runoff
might be directed must be well protected with substantial rock cover
(rip rap). 89
The regulations seemed to encourage moving existing tailings
to a more isolated and secure site for final disposal.' In deciding
whether or not to move the tailings, the following features had to be
considered: remoteness from populated areas; long-term threat to
10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, technical criteria 1 and 4 (1995).
I3 Id. at criterion 3.
14 Id. at criterion 5A. New tailings impoundments were also required to have leak
detection systems below the liners to ensure that major failures in the liner would be
detected. Id. criterion 5E(l). A drainage system was to be installed at the bottom of the
impoundment for dewatering the tailings. Id. criterion 5E(3).
"5 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 6 (1994). The criterion 6 regulations were
changed in 1995 to require actual verification that the 20 pCi/m2/s limit had been
achieved. 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 6 (1995). See generally infra notes 516, 533.
Radon emissions from unreclaimed and uncovered tailings commonly range from
300 to 500 pCi/m2/s. Standards Licensed Sites, supra note 20, at 45,931. Radon concen-
tration in air is generally described in terms of picocuries per liter (pCi/L). See supra
note 28. The rate of emanation, or flux, of radon from a surface is defined as the rate
at which radon atoms enter the atmosphere across a unit area of that surface per unit
time. This may be described in terms of picocuries of radon per square meter per
second (pCi/m 2/s). NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 34, 35.
'6 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 6 (1995).
I' Id. at criterion 4(d).
I Id. at criteria 4(c), 4(d).
I' Id. at criterion 4(d).
'0 Id. at criteria 1, 3, 4. See Montange, supra note 42, at 353-56.
1995-96]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
groundwater; and ability to minimize natural forces that might
erode, disturb, or disperse reclaimed tailings.9 The regulations state
that, in judging the adequacy of an existing site, "primary emphasis
must be given to isolation of tailings or wastes, a matter having
long-term impacts, as opposed to consideration of only short-term
convenience or benefits such as minimization of transportation or
land acquisition costs." '92 The regulations also reflect Congress's
view that these sites should be permanently reclaimed so that active
maintenance is not necessary to preserve the site.93
Existing tailings impoundments were exempt from the require-
ment that tailings impoundments be lined.94 Otherwise, older mills
would have had to shut down operations and build new impound-
ments. The regulations did state that, by October 1, 1984, existing
mills had to have a monitoring program in place to protect ground-
water.95 The quality of water upgradient of the tailings site would
be used to establish site specific groundwater protection stan-
dards.96 If leakage from a tailings impoundment were detected,
then the operator had 18 months to establish a groundwater correc-
tive action program. 97 The program had to restore groundwater to
its original quality98 and in doing so "the program must address
removing the hazardous constituents that have entered the ground-
water at the point of compliance or treating them in place."99
" 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 1 (1995). See also id. at criteria 3, 4(a), 4(b),
4(e).
, Id. at criterion 1. However, in 1983 Congress amended UMTRCA instructing the
NRC to consider economic costs as one factor in making reclamation decisions. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Appropriations Authorization, Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2067,
2080 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (1988). Thus, the intro-
duction to NRC's regulations now reads: "All site specific licensing decisions based on
the criteria in this Appendix . . . will take into account the risk to the public health and
safety and the environment with due consideration to the economic costs involved and
any other factors the Commission determines to be appropriate." 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A,
intro. (1995).
"3 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 1, (1995). See H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra
note 42, pt. 1, at 16, pt. 2, at 71, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7439, 7471.
'9 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 5A(l) (1995). In its administration of the
Clean Air Act, the EPA has since the early 1990's required that operational uranium
mill tailings impoundments be lined. See infra notes 518-528 and accompanying text.
' 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A., criterion 7A (1995).
'6 Id. See also id. at criteria 5B, 5C, 5D.
'I ld. at criterion 5D.
See id. at criteria 5D, 5F.
Id. at criterion 5D. On the regulations governing groundwater restoration, see
generally John L.Watson, Groundwater Issues Affecting the Mining and Milling Indus-
tries, in GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION, Paper No. is, at 15-29 to 15-35 (Rocky ML
Min. L. Fdn. 1991).
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Finally, the regulations required each operator to establish
financial sureties so that sufficient funds would be available to com-
plete reclamation."t The surety would be reviewed annually by the
NRC to assure that enough money would be available to finish
reclamation if the work had to be performed by an independent
contractor.101
Objections to the final rules implementing UMTRCA, Title II,
came mainly from environmental groups. They complained that,
under the Reagan Administration, the allowable radon emissions
level from reclaimed tailings impoundments was ten times greater
than that originally set by the NRC in 198 0 ."°e In 1980, the NRC
also had required that the protective tailings cover be constructed so
as to last "thousands of years." ' 3 This was changed by the Rea-
gan-era EPA to "at least 200 years."10' 4 Questions were also raised
as to why the UMTRCA standards set no specific limits for radon
emissions from operating tailings piles. 5 The only specific radon
limit was the 20 pCi/m2/s limit on emissions after the tailings had
been reclaimed."ee
A final criticism concerned the Clean Air Act. The Reagan-era
EPA maintained that the standards developed for UMTRCA also
satisfied the Clean Air Act requirements for regulating
100 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 9 (1995).
101 Id.
02 See, e.g., Chris Shuey, Bringing Tailings Under Control, 10 WORKBOOK 110,
Ill (1985); Standards Licensed Sites, supra note 20, at 45,937. The emission standard
set by EPA for reclaimed tailings was 20 pCi/m2/s. See supra text accompanying note
85. In 1980 it had been set at 2 pCi/m 2/s by the NRC. Uranium Mill Licensing Require-
ments, supra note 74, at 65,528, 65,534. In Colorado, an Agreement State, the 2
pCi/m2/s standard for reclaimed tailings has been retained. 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PRO-
GRAMS, supra note 28, at 4-50.
03 Uranium Mill Licensing Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,521, 65,528 (1980).
' The actual wording is: "Be effective for one thousand years, to the extent
reasonably achievable, and, in any case, for at least 200 years." Standards Licensed Sites,
supra note 20, at 45,947 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 192.32 (1994)). See also 10 C.F.R. §
40 app. A, criterion 6 (NRC regulations covering same subject). In fact, EPA calculated
that it would require about 265,000 years for the radon-222 emissions from existing piles
to be reduced to 10% of its initial value. OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note
22, at 3-13.
'o' See, e.g., Standards Licensed Sites, supra note 20, at 45,936.
,0 The EPA explained in 1983 that a radon emissions limit for operating tailings
impoundments was not practical because of the varied conditions that occurred at differ-
ent sites and during different phases of a milling operation. Instead of setting a specific
limit, EPA anticipated that companies would follow regulations for uranium mills adopted
by the NRC in the late 1970s which mandated that all tailings impoundments limit
radon to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) limits. Id.
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radionuclides.' 7 Environmental groups disagreed and went to
court. The results of this litigation were to have a great impact on
UMTRCA's implementation in the 1990s." 8
Thanks to the new Reagan-era EPA, uranium companies had
fewer complaints about reclamation standards than they had earlier.
Also, by the early 1980s, the uranium industry was concerned with
more pressing problems than reclamation standards.' 9
III. THE FAILURE TO EXPEDITIOUSLY RECLAIM
In the 1990s, the EPA criticized the lassitude with which the
private uranium milling industry had addressed reclamation in the
1980s." ° In a veiled reproach to NRC's regulatory practices, the
EPA argued that delays in implementing UMTRCA violated the
intent of Congress. According to the EPA, the legislative history and
actions of Congress confirm "UMTRCA's purpose to require expe-
ditious public health protection.""' "Expeditious control of dis-
posed tailings was paramount."".
The EPA is correct in at least one of its assertions. One of the
most striking features in the history of UMTRCA was the slow pace
and hesitancy of its implementation. The eight case studies which
follow will show that after milling stopped, it was essentially the
companies that determined when reclamation would begin and at
what pace it would proceed. It is much less clear if this failure to
expeditiously reclaim can be considered a violation of the intent of
Congress. Attitudes of Congress and of the Executive changed in
the early 1980s. The emergence of a new indifference to rapid recla-
mation can be explained by two important events: (1) Ronald Rea-
gan was elected President, and (2) the bottom fell out of the urani-
um market.
The Reagan Administration showed a new empathy for the
problems facing corporate America in general, and the mining in-
dustry in particular." 3 In the early 1980s uranium producers need-
'7 Id. at 45,939-40.
'"8 See infra text accompanying notes 501-525.
" See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.
o See, e.g., Health Standards, supra note 2, at 60,341-43, 60,349.
.. Id. at 60,342. See also id. at 60,343-44, 60,349; Health and Environmental
Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,174, 32,176-78
(1993) (proposed rule).
"t Health Standards supra note 2, at 60,343.
"3 See Paul R. Portney, Natural Resources and the Environment, in THE REAGAN
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ed understanding from government. Uranium prices had crashed in
1980 and failed to recover."4 Prices fell from over $40 per pound
of uranium oxide in the late 1970s, to $25 by 1980, and to $17 per
pound by 1982."' Prices for uranium oxide remained below $20 a
pound through most of the 1980s and in 1989 dipped below $10 a
pound, remaining at this historically-low level to the mid-1990s.1
6
The jobs lost in the uranium mining and milling bust of the early
1980s never came back,"7 although some companies with long-
term contracts maintained production at low levels through the late
1980s." ' Most uranium mining stopped. It simply did not pay to
mine existing reserves." 9 Such a situation was completely unfore-
seen in the uranium legislation Congress had enacted only a few
years earlier.
In UMTRCA, Title II, Congress emphasized the proper siting
and construction of new lined tailings impoundments. This was how
public health and the environment were to be protected from urani-
um mill tailings. The future, however, did not conform to this mod-
RECORD 141 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1984); James L. Regens et al.,
Deja Vu and Western Energy Development, in ENERGY AND THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES 183 (James L. Regens et al. eds., 1982); Donald C. Menzel, Redirecting the
Implementation of a Law: The Reagan Administration and Coal Surface Mining Regula-
tion, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 411 (1983).
"' The uranium bust has been blamed on collapsed cartels, huge stockpiles, Three
Mile Island, and growing foreign competition. See generally Domestic Uranium Mining
and Milling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nuc. Regulation of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 467 (1983) [hereinafter Domestic
Uranium Hearing]; OWEN supra note 17, at 54, 55; H. Hamilton Hackney III, Comment,
Recent Congressional Proposals for Providing Relief to the Domestic Uranium Industry:
Saving Grace or Just Another Expensive Bailout? 10 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 171, 177-
80 (1990).
.. A.D. Owen, Short-Term Price Formation in the U.S. Uranium Market, 6 ENER-
GY J. 37, 41 (1985).
"' See id.; George White, Jr., Uranium: Price Plunge Continues, ENGIN. & MINING
J., Mar. 1990, at 59; Thomas C. Pool, Uranium: A Lackluster Year, ENGIN. & MINING
J., Mar. 1995, at 78-80. In mid-1995 prices for uranium oxide rose above $10 a pound
for the first time since the late 1980's. Ray E. Harris, Industrial Minerals and Uranium
Update, WYO. GEo-NOTES, Aug. 1995, at 32.
"7 For example, in Wyoming total employment in the uranium industry went from
5,000 in March 1980, to under 2,500 by December 1981. The employment level was
below 1,000 by the end of 1984, and by 1986 only 435 people in the state were
employed in the industry. WYO. MINING ASS'N, WYOMING MINERAL INDUSTRY FACTS
1985 at 40 (1986).
"' See James W. Sanguinetti, The U.S. Production Industry 3 (Sept. 1988) (paper
presented at USCEA Uranium Seminar 1988, available from U.S. Council for Energy
Awareness (USCEA), Washington, D.C.); Domestic Uranium Hearing, supra note 114, at
48.
ji Domestic Uranium Hearing, supra note 114, at 18.
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el. In the 1980s, rather than supervise construction of new mills, the
NRC had to preside over the slow death of an industry. Congressio-
nal hearings in the 1980s make clear Congress's concern and com-
passion for beleaguered uranium producers. 20 This concern was
shared by the Reagan Administration. No one at the time was op-
posed to expeditious reclamation, but neither were the uranium
companies going to be forced to reclaim if they did not want to.
This government tolerance characterized reclamation during most of
the 1980s.
IV. CASE 1: HOMESTAKE MINING COMPANY MILL, NEW MEXICO
A. Introduction
Throughout the 1980s, Homestake had problems with radon
emissions and airborne contaminants.2' The threat posed by blow-
ing tailings and radon emissions was greatly increased by the fact
that several housing estates had been built near the mill.'22 In addi-
tion, the usual means for controlling radon emissions could not be
employed because of the construction design used for the
Homestake tailings impoundment.'23
The tailings at Homestake are now being covered with soil,
which will control the radon problem. This, however, will not elimi-
nate the threat these tailings could pose to the surrounding environ-
ment. The Homestake tailings will be reclaimed where they stand,
on the floodplains of the San Mateo Creek and Lobo Canyon.'24
Liquids leaking from the unlined tailings piles into the groundwater
are the final danger this mill presents to the environment and nearby
residents. This problem has been more amenable to solution, thanks
to unusual persistence and considerable expense on the part of
' For a description of these hearings and the various schemes proposed in Con-
gress to aid the stricken uranium industry, see Hackney, supra note 114, at 185-96. See
also DANIEL BORSON, FoREVER IN ITS DEBT 6-8 Public Citizen, Critical Mass Energy
Project, June 1989; Collins, supra note 16, at 494.
"21 See infra notes 135-148 and accompanying text.
.. In 1989 EPA reported there were 187 people living within one to two kilome-
ters of the Homestake tailings impoundment and 390 people living within five kilometers
of the tailings. 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 9-11.
" Petition from the Homestake Mining Co. for Reconsideration and Stay from
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 4, 7-8 (Feb. 13, 1990) (on file
with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-79-11) [hereinafter Petition]. See also infra notes
140-148 and accompanying text.
124 See infra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
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Homestake.'25
The Homestake mill began operations in 1958. 26 In 1974,
New Mexico signed with the NRC as an "Agreement State" and
took over regulation of uranium milling activities. 7 The agree-
ment lasted until June 1986, when New Mexico gave up regulating
uranium milling due to high costs.'28 The state also had tired of
battling in the courts and the legislature while trying to get mill
owners to clean up tailings.
129
Homestake closed operations in 1990.30 Most uranium mills
had closed earlier when uranium prices crashed in the early 1980s.
By the mid-1980s, Homestake was the only mill out of five in New
Mexico still operating. 3' In its last year it operated at only 20% of
capacity. 32
Tailings produced at Homestake were placed in two unlined
piles. The smaller tailings pile has not been used since 1962 and
contains about 1.2 million tons of tailings.' The larger pile con-
tains more than 21 million tons of tailings.'34
'z See infra notes 149-172 and accompanying text.
Petition, supra note 123, at 3.
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, SUPERFUND RECORD OF DECISION: HOMESTAKE MINING, NM at 2 (Sept. 1989)
(hereinafter HOMESTAKE R.O.D.]. See also, supra note 13.
"n Reassertion of Certain Regulatory Authority in the State of New Mexico, 51
Fed. Reg. 19,432 (1986).
"r See Nolan Hester, State Quits Tailings Cleanup Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J., May
11, 1986, at Cl. See generally Grammer, supra note 13 at 505, 511-14.
"o U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Transcript of Public Hearings on National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, at III (Santa Fe, N.M., Jan. 21-22,
1992) (testimony of Mark Hiles, Homestake Mining Co.) (on file with EPA Air Docket,
Docket No. A-91-67) [hereinafter Public Hearings].
, ' Steve Hinchman, In New Mexico's Uranium Belt: Rebottling the Nuclear Genie,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 19, 1987, at 6.
.3. See Letter from Ramon Hall, Director NRC Region IV, to Homestake Mining
Co (attn. Mr. Richard Farrell) at 5 (Dec. 21, 1989) (on file with NRC/PRD, ACN.
9001030079); Petition, supra note 123, at 3.
'33 HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at 1; Petition, supra note 123, at 112.
" Letter from F.R. Craft, Homestake Mining Co., to Ramon Hall, NRC, with
Attached Specifications for Recontouring of the Large Tailing Impoundment attach, at I
(June 29, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9209210200); HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra
note 127, at 1.
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B. Excessive Radon Emissions and Blowing Tailings
Residents who lived near Homestake were quoted by one jour-
nalist as saying that "gales whip sands off the pile in plumes that
can stretch six miles."' 35 In 1987, Homestake began using a chem-
ical stabilizer to control blowing tailings. After an inspection in
November 1988, the NRC called the program "ineffective," and
issued a Notice of Violation when excessive blowing of tailings was
observed.'36 In addition to chemical stabilizers, Homestake also
tried erosion control blankets, sprinklers, and even old tires to con-
trol the blowing tailings.'37
In 1989 an EPA study concluded that the lifetime fatal cancer
risks for individuals living near uranium mills that were operating or
on standby was greatest at Homestake 38 When the EPA set new
radon emission standards for tailings piles at operating mills in
December 1989, Homestake stated that it would be impossible to
meet these standards.
39
The design of the Homestake tailings impoundment precludes
the usual means of controlling radon emissions. Many tailings im-
poundments found at other mills are true ponds that can hold water.
These ponds are created by placing an earthen dam across a narrow
valley or dry stream bed. With such an impoundment, tailings emis-
sions easily can be controlled by covering the tailings with water,
although this can aggravate seepage."4 Homestake's large tailings
pile was built on flat ground, covered 170 acres, and was 85 to 100
feet high. 4' The pile was built of tailings sands. Tailings were
pumped from the mill to the pile where, building on an earth-filled
dike, the coarse sands were hydraulically placed to form a rectangu-
lar impoundment.'42 The solution and slimes were allowed to float
' Hinchman, supra note 131, at 6.
136 Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8903, from Pete Garcia, Project Manager,
NRC Region IV, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9005090022).
137 See HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at 2; Public Hearings, supra note 130,
at 112, 124.
" 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 9-12, 9-13. However, in
another 1989 study EPA concluded that radon from the Homestake tailings was not
contributing significantly to elevated indoor radon levels found in nearby homes.
HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at ii, 6-9. Such apparent contradictions are common
in assessments of the radon danger.
"3 Petition, supra note 123, at 7, 8.
2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 8-18.
"' Letter from F.R. Craft, supra note 134, attach. at 1.
I2 Id. See also Memorandum from Raymond Gonzales & Dawn Jacoby, to Docket
File No. 40-8903, NRC Region IV, at 2 (May 28, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
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to the center.143 Over the years a large hill of tailings was created.
The top of this tailings pile contains two basins which hold tailings
solution and slimes more than 60 feet deep.'
Another common way to cut radon emissions uses an interim
cover of earth over the tailings. 45 This, however, requires heavy
equipment to work on the pile, and the tailings usually must be
dry. Placing an interim soil cover over the tailings at Homestake
would have meant stopping operations and, essentially, beginning
reclamation. Homestake had kept operating throughout the 1980s,
albeit at a greatly reduced level, and had hopes of resuming full
production once the uranium market recovered. 47 The company
did not want to close the mill and the NRC showed no inclination
to force reclamation despite the unresolved problem of airborne
contaminants.'
C. Groundwater Contamination
Groundwater contamination at Homestake was first documented
in 1975 in a study done by the EPA and the state of New Mexi-
co. 49 Some wells used by nearby residents were found to be con-
taminated. Residents were discouraged from using these wells and
were provided with bottled water by Homestake. °
In 1976, Homestake entered an agreement with New Mexico to
install a pumping system that would stop further contamination and
would begin cleaning up the contaminated aquifers.' Although
the pumping system started up in the late 1970s, in 1983 the EPA
placed the Homestake Mill on the National Priorities List of
Superfund sites because of groundwater contamination. 5 ' When
9206160365).
',' Public Hearings, supra note 130, at 112.
'" Letter from F.R. Craft, supra note 134, attach. at 1.
'4 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 8-18. Chemical stabili-
zation sprays that form coatings on the dry tailings can control dust, but are not effec-
tive in controlling radon-222 since an impermeable cover is not obtained. Id. at 8-19.
" See Petition, supra note 123, at 8.
'41 See id. at 3, 9-13.
" NRC's position changed in the early 1990's. See infra text accompanying notes
496-535.
'49 HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at 2.
"o Petition, supra note 123, at 15-16.
' Id. at 16; HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at 2.
's HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at 2. EPA chose not to list sites on the
National Priority List that were directly licensed by the NRC. At the time of listing,
Homestake was licensed by the State of New Mexico under the Agreement State Pro-
gram. Joint Hearing, supra note 47, at 262.
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elevated selenium levels were discovered in residents' wells,
Homestake agreed to construct a pipe system to bring water from
the town of Milan to the housing estates on Homestake's southern
boundary.'53 This water hook-up was completed in 1985 at a total
cost to Homestake of $3.4 million. 54 Since receiving town water,
nearby residents have shown much less concern over the issue of
seepage from the tailings.
55
After operations ceased in 1990, Homestake submitted a recla-
mation plan that estimated total reclamation costs for the tailings
and mill site at almost $20 million."6 Of this amount, over $8 mil-
lion was for restoring groundwater.'
The groundwater clean-up effort used wells and pumps for two
purposes. First, collection wells were located near the downstream
side of the large tailings pile. These collection wells caught seepage
as it leaked from the tailings and pumped it back onto the tailings
pile.'58 Injection wells served a second purpose. They were located
on the downstream, southern property boundary, adjacent to the
residential estates. These injection wells pumped fresh water into the
top two contaminated aquifers.'59 The fresh water diluted and dis-
persed contaminants. Fresh-water injection also created a hydrologic
barrier, preventing the migration of hazardous constituents towards
the housing estates which lay beyond the wells."W
An additional cleansing effect occurred when the wells operat-
ed in tandem. When the collection wells next to the tailings were
operating, they created a trough, reversing the normal flow of
groundwater.'6' With the fresh water injection wells also operating,
fresh water was pulled back toward the collection wells, flushing
out hazardous constituents and cleaning the aquifer.'62
' Petition, supra note 123, at 19-20.
15 Id.
I" HOMESTAKE R.O.D., supra note 127, at 3.
5 1 AK GEOCONSULT, I RECLAMATION PLAN: HOMESTAKE MINING Co., tbl. 6
(Jan. 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9102120391).
157 I id.
'' I id. at 28.
"s Letter from Roy E. Williams, Williams & Associates (hydrogeology), to Tom
Olson, Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC, Denver, Colo. 1, 2 (Apr. 13, 1987) (on
file with NRCIPDR, ACN. 8707020287). The fresh water being injected came from deep
wells, drilled into a third uncontaminated deeper aquifer, which is a prolific producer of
groundwater. Id.
' I AK GEOCONSULT, supra note 156, at 28.
161 1 id.
'62 1 id. The groundwater clean-up system also includes over 400 monitor wells that
are regularly sampled for constituents. Petition, supra note 123, at 18.
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This groundwater clean-up system has been continually refined
since it was developed in the 1970s and 1980s. 63 It has also pro-
duced results. An NRC assessment in the early 1990s noted that
much of the contamination beyond the Homestake property bound-
ary had been cleaned up, "[alithough some isolated occurrences of
contaminated water exist. ...""
When the NRC took over regulation of Homestake from New
Mexico in 1986, it found only one major problem with the ground-
water restoration effort. Hazardous constituents were being recycled.
Collected seepage was pumped back onto the tailings pile at an
average rate of 300 gallons per minute (gpm) 165 where it could
leak out again. Construction of a 24 acre synthetically lined evapo-
ration pond in late 1990 resolved this major problem."6 The col-
lection wells now return seepage to this lined pond. Once deposited
in the pond, evaporation is increased by sprinklers that spray or mist
the liquids. 67
A misting sprinkler also has been installed on the larger tailings
pile to speed up evaporation and the drying of the tailings."6 After
drying, the tailings will be reshaped to ensure good drainage and
then will be permanently covered with dirt and rock. The cover will
keep out water and protect the tailings from future wetting which
could leach contaminants into the groundwater. The cover will also
greatly diminish radon emanating from the tailings pile.
Water quality for the first year in which the evaporation pond
was used showed "few changes in constituent concentrations.""
However, the NRC Project Manager did expect progress and noted
that, from a longer term perspective, data from 1982 to 1991 shows
"a slow response time to changes in water quality rather than no
response."'7 Homestake is among a minority of companies that
'6 As Homestake notes, "[t]he system is a dynamic system, and the number and
location of wells and their respective pumping rates are adjusted as needed to maximize
their effectiveness." Petition, supra note 123, at 19.
164 Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-8903, at I (Mar. 8, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9103190273).
Letter from Roy E. Williams, supra note 159, at 2.
J Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-8903, at 2 (May 11, 1992) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN.
9206040168). The memorandum also notes that Homestake's program now conforms to




'6 Id. at 3.
"7 Id. In 1994 Homestake reported that site compliance standards had been met for
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have made a serious long term effort to resolve groundwater con-
tamination. Even so, when asked for a firm reclamation schedule for
the NRC license, Homestake gave 2010 as their projected date for
completing groundwater corrective actions.' NRC's analysis
agrees that this date is reasonable.' The fact that successful
groundwater restoration efforts could take more than 30 years indi-
cates how difficult groundwater clean-up can be.
D. Future Danger From Floods
The Homestake tailings piles are located on the floodplains of
San Mateo Creek and Lobo Canyon which have over 300 square
miles of upstream watershed.'73 In a reclamation plan submitted in
January 1991, Homestake admitted that long term flood dangers in
this location meant they could not satisfy all the federal criteria for
reclaiming tailings in place.'74 Nevertheless, NRC did not press for
the more expensive option of moving the tailings.'75 Homestake
will construct a levee on the east side of the large tailings pile to
divert flood flows from Lobo Canyon.'76 Additional flood and ero-
sion protection will come from covering surfaces and outslopes of
the two piles with rock (riprap). 7
V. CASE 2: UNITED NUCLEAR CORPORATION'S CHURCH ROCK
MILL, NEW MEXICO
A. Introduction
United Nuclear Corporation's (UNC) mill provides an interest-
ing contrast to Homestake. It was built some 20 years after
four constituents: chromium, thorium-230 and radium-226 and 228. The company request-
ed that these be removed from 'the groundwater corrective action plan. According to
Homestake, three main hazardous constituents remain significant at the site: selenium,
uranium, and molybdenum. Letter from F.R. Craft, Homestake Mining Company, to
NRC, Division of Waste Management, attach, at 3 (July 26, 1994) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 9408040220).
"' Reclamation Schedules, 57 Fed. Reg. 20,716 (1992).
172 id.
" Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8903, supra note 142, at 7.
,14 1 AK GEOCONSULT, supra note 156, at 21-22.
'"" In July, 1993, NRC issued a "Finding of No Significant Impact" ("FONSI")
concerning the reclamation in-place of the Homestake tailings. Finding of No Significant
Impact, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,584 (1993).
,76 Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8903, supra note 142, at 7.
77 Id.
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Homestake when the dangers of groundwater pollution from urani-
um mill tailings were already understood. UNC operated for a much
shorter period, and closed eight years before Homestake. Yet in its
groundwater clean-up effort, UNC has made less progress than
Homestake."' UNC is also less clear on what future actions are
necessary to restore groundwater.
The UNC mill is located in McKinley County, New Mexico,
17 miles northeast of Gallup and one mile south of the Navajo
Indian Reservation. 79 In 1990, there were 26 rural Navajo resi-
dences within a two mile radius of the mill. 80
UNC is a subsidiary of UNC Inc. By the early 1990s, the par-
ent company had largely left the energy field to deal with products
and services in the aviation industry. '8 The Church Rock mill was
constructed in 1977 to process ore from several underground urani-
um mines already operating in the vicinity. 82 The mill was built
in an alluvial valley known as Pipeline Arroyo, which contains an
ephemeral channel flowing between the mill and the tailings pond.
The arroyo joins the Puerco River about 2.5 miles downstream from
the mill. This river is also dry much of the year.8 3 Up until the
mid-1980s, treated water from de-watering of nearby underground
uranium mines flowed through the arroyo to the river.'84
During its brief operation, the Church Rock mill produced
approximately 3.6 million metric tons of tailings,8 5 less than one-
fifth of the tailings found at Homestake. The tailings were contained
in a large 100 acre unlined pond. The pond was created by a clay
core dike constructed along one side of the canyon wall.8 6 Internal
' See infra notes 202-212 and accompanying text.
W7 illiam Rowe, Region 6 Involvement in New Mexico: Uranium Mills and Mines,
in EPA WORKSHOP ON RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SIms 26 (Air and Radiation,
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, March 1990).
"0 Memorandum from Dana C. Ward, Project Manager, NRC Region IV to Docket
File No. 40-8907, (June 13, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9007160149).
181 Harlan S. Byrne, UNC Inc.: Former United Nuclear Finally Finds a Profitable
Home, BARRONS, Dec. 3, 1990, at 48-49.
82 Rowe, supra note 179, at 26.
Il7 The drainage area of Pipeline Arroyo upstream of the disposal area is about 17
square miles. Memorandum from Raymond 0. Gonzales et al., Project Manager, NRC
Region IV to Docket File No. 40-8907 at 9 (Feb. 5, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR,
ACN. 9102120409).
'" OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, SUPERFUND RECORD OF DECISION: UNITED NUCLEAR, NM at II (Sept. 1988)
[hereinafter UNITED NUCLEAR R.O.D.].
83 Joint Hearing, supra note 47, at 197.
186 Letter from Harry Pettengill, NRC Region IV, to UNC Inc. app. B at II (Dec.
12, 1986) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8612190178); EPA ASSESSMENT OF URANIUM
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dikes created three separate cells." 7
Two years after beginning operations, the mill received national
notoriety when part of the embankment gave way in the southern
cell of the tailings pond. Representative Morris Udall explained the
consequences of this spill when he opened Congressional Hearings
on the matter in 1979.
On July 16 of this year a uranium mill tailings impoundment dam
failed, releasing 93 million gallons of contaminated liquid and
1,100 tons of hazardous solid waste into an arroyo near Church
Rock, New Mexico. The radioactive and chemically dangerous
materials were carried to the Rio Puerco, through Navajo Indian
grazing lands near the City of Gallup, New Mexico, and about 20
miles into the State of Arizona, leaving contaminated residue over
a distance of close to 100 miles.'88
Another commentator noted that "except for the bomb tests, Church
Rock was probably the biggest single release of radioactive poisons
on American soil."' 89
B. Groundwater Contamination
The tailings embankment was repaired and operations resumed
in the fall of 1979. Soon after, the State of New Mexico announced
that extensive groundwater contamination had been found indepen-
dent of the spill."9 UNC was ordered by the state to develop a
discharge plan to control contaminated seepage from its tailings
pond. 1' In 1981, UNC installed collection wells to catch seepage
and pump it back to the tailings pond.192 While this effort slowed
the spread of pollution,' 93 UNC never complied with the state's
MILL TAILING PILES at 4 (Oct. 1991) (on file with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-91-
67).
"' Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8907, supra note 183, at 2.
"' Mill Tailings Dam Break at Church Rock, New Mexico: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environ. of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1979).
"' HARVEY WASSERMAN & NORMAN SOLOMON, KILLING OUR OWN: THE DISASTER
OF AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION 178 (1982).
' Memorandum from Michael Brown, Radiation Protection Bureau, Environ.
Improvement Division, New Mexico, to Denise Fort, Director E.I.D. 2 (Dec 16, 1986)
(on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8701160031).
191 Id.
'~ UNITED NUCLEAR R.O.D., supra note 184, at 4.
3 David Staats, Land Swap Slows Cleanup, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 11, 1986, at
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request for a formal plan to deal with groundwater contamina-
tion."'
Once milling stopped in 1982, New Mexico also failed to get
UNC to begin reclamation. State law required reclamation to begin
within a year after the end of tailings deposition. 9 Other mining
companies were granted extensions, but UNC's request was re-
fused.' 96 The state cited thorium-230 leaking into groundwater
from the UNC tailings pond as one reason for the refusal.'97
In 1983, EPA placed the UNC Church Rock mill on the Na-
tional Priorities List of Superfund sites.'98 The EPA justified this
by reference to offsite migration of radionuclides and chemical
constituents into groundwater, surface water, and air.' 99
UNC submitted a "conceptual" reclamation plan to New Mexi-
co in late 1984, but the plan ignored federal requirements which the
company argued were inapplicable in New Mexico.2°° Little prog-
ress was made on a formal reclamation plan before New Mexico
returned responsibility for licensing uranium mills to the federal
government in 1986."'
In 1988, the EPA released a study of groundwater contamina-
tion that confirmed observations made by the state of New Mexico
some nine years earlier. "The tailings ponds are a source of con-
taminants to all aquifers at the site. Seepage of tailing liquids has
entered the alluvial system from the three tailings cells to varying
degrees.... Where the alluvium is absent, tailings seepage has also
entered the bedrock aquifers....
A new effort to deal with this contamination was finally
launched in 1988, over UNC's protests. UNC was threatened with
an Administrative Order unless it voluntarily implemented its recla-
mation plan.0 3 This reclamation plan called for the construction of
"9 Memorandum from Michael Brown, supra note 190, at 2.
i ld. at 1.
' Staats, supra note 193, at C3.
' Id. See also Memorandum from Michael Brown, supra note 190, at 2.
' Rowe, supra note 179, at 26.
"9 UNITED NUCLEAR R.O.D., supra note 184, at 4. See supra note 152.
2"o Memorandum from Michael Brown, supra note 190, at 1. See generally
Montange, supra note 42, at 344-48 (on the attempt by New Mexican uranium produc-
ers, Senator Domenici and others to resist imposition of NRC regulations on New
Mexico).
201 Memorandum from Michael Brown, supra note 190, at 1.
UNITED NUCLEAR R.O.D., supra note 184, at 11.
'03 Letter from Juan Velasquez, President, United Nuclear Corporation, to Raymond
Hall, Director, Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC, Denver 1, (Dec. 4, 1990) (on file
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9101030196). UNC feared "duplicate work, wasted effort and the
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two five-acre synthetically lined evaporation ponds to hold water
and contaminants recovered from the aquifer. °4 Previously, col-
lected seepage was pumped into a leaking unlined pit in the central
tailings cell. 5 UNC also was required to install additional pumps
to collect contaminated water. This brought groundwater clean-up
costs to around $3 million." 6
Results of these efforts have been unpromising. In 1995, EPA
noted that concentrations of nitrates, sulfates, and total dissolved
solids in the alluvium aquifer "[had] changed very little in the last
four plus years . ,.0' Wells to the north of the impoundment
were removing significant amounts of contamination.0 ' However,
in the groundwater under the central tailings cell (Zone One) which
had served as the collection point for returned seepage, there were
serious problems of water quantity and quality.2" Pumps had noth-
ing to pump. This situation is common when there is a minimal
amount of recharge to the groundwater. After the existing water is
pumped out, individual pockets of contaminated water remain, sepa-
rated from each other by air and solid particles." ° The NRC had
no suggestions for resolving the problem. In 1992, they noted that
"the poor response to pumping in Zone [One] may indicate that no
waste of money" if they were forced to begin work before NRC had approved a final
reclamation plan, and then later requirements were changed. Id. at 2. UNC also objected
to having to clean up contaminated groundwater from a site which they argued contained
no groundwater until nearby mines began discharging water in the late 1960s. Letter
from Juan Velasquez, UNC, to Michael Burkhart, Director, New Mexico Environmental
Improvement Division 3 (July 13, 1987) (on file with NRC/PDR, ANC. 8707310005).
See also infra note 253 and accompanying text.
4 Canonie Environmental, Ground Water Corrective Action, Church Rock Site 6, 7
(Dec. 1990) (on file with NRC, PDR, ACN. 9101290361).
" Letter from Harry Pettengill, supra note 186, app. B at 11; UNITED NUCLEAR
R.O.D., supra note 184, at 11.
Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8907, supra note 183, at 21.
... Letter from S.K. Ghose, Superfund Enforcement, EPA, to Julie Curtiss, Navajo
Superfund Program I (Mar. 13, 1995) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9503230243). See
also Letter from Kent Bostick, Jacobs Engineering Group, to Shawn Ghose, EPA 3 (Apr.
12, 1995) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9505150159).
. Latif Hamdan, Technical Reviewer, NRC, Technical Evaluation Report, UNC at
3 (Oct. 12, 1994) (on file with NRC/PDR, DKT. 40-8903).
' Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV to
Docket File No. 40-8907, at 2, 3, 6 (Mar. 4, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9203110337).
to See, e.g., Fredric Hoffman, Ground-Water Remediation Using "Smart Pump and
Treat", GROUND WATER, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 98, 100; Clinton W. Hall, Practical Limits
to Pump-and-Treat Technology for Aquifer Remediation, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TECH.
CENTER, July 1988, at 3.
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further action is feasible." '' In late 1994, the NRC suggested that
UNC might want to submit an application for Alternate Concentra-
tion Limits for both the alluvium and the contaminated aquifer
under the central tailings cell.2"2
C. Alternate Concentration Limits
UNC proposed an unrealistic date of December 1995, for com-
pletion of groundwater clean-up. Surprisingly, NRC accepted this
date and published it in the Federal Register."3 Groundwater
remediation could have been completed by this date only if the
NRC agreed to relax clean-up standards UNC currently must meet.
Federal regulations do allow applications for such Alternate Con-
centration Limits. 14 If granted, these alternate limits ease back-
ground standards for specific constituents. However, conditions for
granting these alternate standards appear to be quite stringent. The
applicant must show that past efforts have reduced contaminants "as
low as reasonably achievable" considering "practicable corrective
actions" available.2"5 The company must also show that the higher
level of contaminants remaining after clean-up "will not pose a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the envi-
ronment . .,2.6 In deciding whether an applicant has met these
conditions, NRC must consider, among other factors, current and
future use of groundwater in the area and the potential for migration
of contaminated groundwater.2"7
Not surprisingly, many mills are interested in obtaining Alter-
nate Concentration Limits.2"' As of the mid-1990s, the NRC was
21 Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8907, supra note 209, at 6.
22 Hamdan, supra note 208, at 3-4.
2"3 Reclamation Schedules, UNC Church Rock Mill, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,512, 24,513
(1992).
224 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 5B(6) (1994). See also Uranium Recovery
Branch, Division of Low Level Waste and Decommissioning, NRC, Draft Final Staff
Technical Position, Alternate Concentration Limits for Title II Uranium Mills (Feb. 1994)
(on file with Uranium Recovery Branch, NRC).
213 10 C.F.R. § 40, app. A, criterion 5B(6) (1994).
216 id.
217 id.
21" As of Dec. 1994, the NRC had received formal applications for Alternate
Concentration Limits from ARCO's Bluewater Uranium mill and Quivira's Ambrosia
Lake mill in New Mexico; the Atlas Corp. mill in Moab, Utah; and, the American
Nuclear Corp. mill in Wyoming. The application for the Western Nuclear mill in Wyo-
ming had been returned as incomplete. An application for UNC's Church Rock mill was
expected in 1995. Telephone Interview with official, Uranium Recovery Branch, NRC, in
1995-961
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still working on final guidelines, and had not granted any applica-
tions." 9 Although the NRC had suggested that UNC submit an ap-
plication for Alternate Concentration Limits, in 1995 NRC refused
UNC's request to shut down most of its extraction pumps in antici-
pation of an Alternate Concentration Limit application submittal. 220
D. Future Danger from Floods
As with the case at Homestake, the tailings in the Pipeline
Arroyo at Church Rock will be reclaimed in place. Engineering
solutions will be used to overcome site deficiencies.2 ' The prima-
ry site deficiency is that the tailings are in an arroyo susceptible to
floods. A poignant forewarning of what might happen if a flood
ever did breach the tailings cover was provided by the infamous
Church Rock tailings spill of 1979.
VI. CASE 3: QUIVIRA (RIO ALGOM) MINING COMPANY'S AMBRO-
SIA LAKE MILL, NEW MEXICO
A. Introduction
The Quivira case is most noteworthy for its groundwater con-
tamination problem. As with Homestake, this case shows just how
difficult groundwater restoration can be. This is true despite
Quivira's long term and innovative efforts to control seepage from
tailings.
The Ambrosia Lake mill is owned by Quivira Mining Compa-
ny, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rio Algom Mining Corporation.
Rio Algom purchased the Quivira Mining Company from Kerr-
McGee Nuclear Corporation in 1989.222 The mill is in a remote
area 20 miles north of Grants, New Mexico. The Ambrosia Lake
mill is built on a flood plain, as are the Homestake and UNC mills.
Rockville, Maryland (Dec. 1994) (notes on file with author).
219 id.
22 Hamdan, supra note 208, at 1, 3.
221 Memorandum from Raymond Gonzales et al. to Docket File No. 40-8907, at 3
(Mar. 21, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9104040055). One of these engineering
solutions is a rock-filled trench (a buried jetty) across the arroyo valley. This will
reinforce a bedrock outcrop next to the tailings pile and help prevent headcutting up-
stream. Id. at 3, 11.
22 Memorandum from Dawn Jacoby et al., Project Managers, NRC Region IV to




The tailings impoundments lie within the drainage basin of Airoyo
del Puerto, an intermittent stream which flows along the east bound-
ary of the site." 3 As in the previous two cases, the NRC has de-
cided that the Quivira tailings piles can be reclaimed in place. 4
The valley is about one mile wide at the mill site. With this width it
is estimated that the probable maximum flood would not damage
the reclaimed tailings. 25
The tailings impoundments at Quivira were constructed like
those at Homestake. Built on flat ground and above grade, the un-
lined impoundment was formed from tailings sands.226 Usually
tailings liquid was pumped from the impoundment into a series of
evaporation ponds. Initially, these unlined ponds leaked.227 By the
late 1980s, Quivira's tailings area exceeded even that of
Homestake's. Quivira's largest pile was 247 acres.228 The embank-
ment containing the tailings was from 25 to 90 feet high, and held
30 million tons of tailings." 9 A contiguous smaller pile held three
million tons of tailings covering 100 acres.230
The Ambrosia Lake mill began operations in 1958, processing
ore from nearby mines, some owned by Quivira.23' The facility
went on standby in January 1985 due to the depressed uranium
market.232 However, the company has continued some small scale
operations. Uranium is extracted from underground mines using
chemically fortified mine waters.233 The mill also is licensed to
process and dispose of byproduct material from the Sequoyah Fuels
uranium hexafluoride conversion facility in Gore, Oklahoma.
2 34
22 Id. at 10-11. The drainage area of Arroyo del Puerto above the mill site is
about 58 square miles. A second drainage area of approximately 3.7 square miles is
located just west of the mill site. Runoff from this area is diverted around the tailings
area by a diversion ditch. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 25-27.
22 Id. at 14.
22 Quivira Mining Co., Proposed Alternative Concentration Limits for the Alluvial
Unit 24, 26 (June 18, 1991) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN. 9107250214) [hereinafter
Proposed ACLs].
'" id. at 11-12.




212 Public Hearings, supra note 130, at 48 (testimony of Bill Ferdinand representing
Rio Algom).
233 Letter from Ramon Hall, Director, Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC Region
IV, to Bill Ferdinand, Quivira Mining Co., enclosure I at 3 (Apr. 12, 1991) (on file
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9104170015).
- U.S. NRC Materials License, Quivira Mining Co. 5 (Sept. 24, 1990) (on file
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B. Groundwater Contamination
In 1983, Quivira signed an Assurance of Discontinuance agree-
ment with the State of New Mexico.2 35 Quivira agreed to address
the problem of contaminants leaking from unlined tailings piles and
evaporation ponds. 36 The key element in Quivira's plan to combat
groundwater contamination was a 6,200-foot-long "interceptor
trench" built on the east side of the largest pile.237 The company
also agreed to quit pumping tailings solution into unlined evapora-
tion ponds.238 However, Quivira continued using its two tailings
piles, even though they were unlined and leaked.239
The new interceptor trench intercepted seepage from the largest
tailings pond. The trench also created a hydrologic sink, causing
contamination that had already moved beyond the trench to flow
back toward the trench.2 ° The effort to clean up the alluvial aqui-
fer was greatly aided by a source of re-charge water available on the
site. Treated water from mine de-watering and mill operations was
pumped into a channel that ran along the northern and eastern
boundary of the mill.241 Water in this channel percolated into the
ground as it passed through the property and flushed contaminants
back toward the trench.242 Water and contaminants caught by the
interceptor trench were then pumped to new lined ponds for evapo-
ration.243
Quivira's tailings had also polluted two aquifers underlying the
alluvium, the Tres Hermanos B and Dakota formations.2" Quivira
argued that these aquifers would be cleaned up in the normal pro-
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9010120084). See also Letter from Bill Ferdinand, Quivira Mining
Co., to Gary Konwinski, NRC, Uranium Recovery Field Office, Denver, attach. at 2
(Dec. 16, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9302180173).
.. Proposed ACLs, supra note 226, at 12.
236 Id.
237 Id. See Quivira Mining Co., Corrective Action Programs, Ambrosia Lake Facility
2-3 (Sept. 25, 1989) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8912070218) [hereinafter Quivira
Mining Co.].
23 Proposed ACLs, supra note 226, at 12.
239 Id. at 13-14.
244 Quivira Mining Co., supra note 237, at 2-3; see also Proposed ACLs, supra
note 226, at 12-13.
24 Proposed ACLs, supra note 226, at 11-13.
2I2 Id. at 13.
243 id. at 12-14.
244 Quivira Mining Co., supra note 237, at 12, 22; Memorandum for Docket File
No. 40-8905, from Cynthia Miller-Corbett, Project Manager, Region IV, NRC 2 (Nov.
16, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9011200276).
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cess of pumping water from its underground uranium mines. Ac-
cording to Quivira, the pumping would pull contaminated
groundwater in these aquifers toward the pumps where it could be
removed. 5
Quivira went on stand-by in 1985 and, in 1986, the NRC took
over licensing the mill from New Mexico. 6 In May 1990, a new
$1.1 million plan to deal with groundwater contamination was ap-
proved.247 The plan built on past clean-up efforts with one major
addition. Quivira committed to begin reclaiming its two unlined
tailings piles.2" This meant that the remaining source of ground-
water contamination would be eliminated. These piles would be
dried and covered, protecting them against any re-wetting that could
again leach contaminants into the groundwater. The company also
agreed that if milling operations resumed, future tailings would be
placed in synthetically lined cells.249 Byproduct material from the
Sequoyah Plant in Gore, Oklahoma, would be deposited in a 2.8
acre lined pond built on top of the smaller tailings pile.250
Quivira has tried to contain and clean up contamination since at
least 1983. Yet in the early 1990s extensive contamination still
existed in both the alluvium and underlying aquifers. Concentrations
of most measured contaminants were well above the background
standards to which groundwater must be restored. 5' There are no
indications that progress will be more rapid in the 1990s than in the
1980s. The hydro-engineering firm hired by Quivira estimated that
successful remediation would not be achieved until the year
2043.252 This date is exactly sixty years after Quivira first signed
245 Quivira Mining Co., supra note 237, at 13, 24-25; Memorandum for Docket File
No. 40-8905, supra note 244, at 5.
" Public Hearings, supra note 130, at 48 (testimony of Bill Ferdinand representing
Rio Algom). See also supra notes 128, 129 and accompanying text.
247 Letter from Peter Luthiger, Quivira Mining Co., to Ramon Hall, NRC, Uranium
Recovery Field Office, Denver, attach, at 1 (Aug. 1, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR,
ACN. 9109100269); Memorandum for Docket File No. 40-8905, supra note 222, at 25.
2,8 Quivira Mining Co., supra note 237, at 13.
24 Id.; Ambrosia Lake Mill, Quivira Mining Co., in EPA ASSESSMENT OF URANIUM
MILL TAILING PILES at 1, 2 (Oct. 1991) (on file with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-
91-67).
25 Public Hearings, supra note 130, at 58-59 (testimony of Bill Ferdinand repre-
senting Rio Algom); Letter from Bill Ferdinand, supra note 234, attach. at 2-4. A de-
watering and interceptor trench, similar to the one for the larger tailings pond, had
already been built in 1989 to catch seepage from the small tailings pile. Letter from
Peter Luthiger, supra note 247, attach, at 2.
231 Memorandum for Docket File No. 40-8905, supra note 244, at 1-4.
252 Letter from Bill Ferdinand, Quivira Mining Co., to Ramon Hall, Director, NRC
Uranium Recovery Field Office, Denver, Colo. attach. at 2-3 (Nov. 22, 1991) (on file
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an agreement with the state of New Mexico to deal with groundwa-
ter contamination.
Quivira's main hope for more rapid and less costly groundwa-
ter clean-up lies with the NRC agreeing to their application for
Alternate Concentration Limits. Quivira's request for Alternate
Concentration Limits repeats arguments made by UNC against the
clean-up standards it must meet. Both companies contend that the
alluvium underlying their mill sites was dry before mining began in
the late 1950s. They argue that water pumped from underground
mines and leaking tailings piles created the alluvium aquifer. Once
this human made re-charge ends, they reason, the aquifer will dissi-
pate naturally and no longer support any use.253
The State of New Mexico has questioned this argument. "[S]ite
remediation may be required regardless if water was, or was not
present in these sediments prior to mining operations. The ground-
water now there is contaminated and could reasonable [sic] be ex-
pected to reach aquifers beneath ... ""'
VII. CASE 4: WESTERN NUCLEAR INC. (PHELPS DODGE) SPLIT
ROCK MILL, WYOMING
A. Introduction
Western Nuclear Inc.'s Split Rock uranium mill provides an-
other example of serious groundwater problems that are as yet unre-
solved. The unlined tailings pond at Western Nuclear was construct-
ed on alluvial sands above two aquifers.255 Over the years these
aquifers were extensively polluted.256 In a 1980 study for the re-
newal of Western Nuclear's license, the NRC argued that this pollu-
tion problem would resolve itself naturally. 7 This view changed
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9112270189). See also Quivira Mining Co., Reclamation Sched-
ules, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,103, 49,104 (1992).
... Proposed ACLs, supra note 226, at 4, 6-12. See also Letter from Juan
Velasquez, supra note 203, at 3.
__ Letter from Richard Ohrbom, Water Resource Specialist, New Mexico Health
and Environment Dept., to Bill Ferdinand, Quivira Mining Co. 1 (Feb. 20, 1991) (on file
with NRCIPDR, ACN. 9103140108).
" MINERAL RESOURCES WASTE MANAGEMENT TEAM (COLLEGE OF MINES AND
EARTH RESOURCES, UNIV. OF IDAHO), OVERVIEW OF GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION
ASSOCIATED WITH SIX OPERATING URANIUM MILLS IN THE UNITED STATES 54, 58-59
(Dec. 30, 1980) (on file with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-82-26) [hereinafter
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION].
" See infra notes 257-283 and accompanying text.
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUC. REG.
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by the late 1980s. NRC is requiring Western Nuclear to remove
contaminants from the aquifer. 58 However, there is still reason to
doubt NRC's commitment to groundwater restoration.259
The Split Rock mill also had a severe problem with wind
blown tailings. The problem was exacerbated by high wind speeds
and by blowing sand which scoured the tailings.26 At most of
Wyoming's uranium mills this would not have been a threat to
public health because the mills are so isolated. However, Western
Nuclear had developed a company town, Jeffrey City, two miles
from the mill.26" ' In the 1970s there were over 2,000 residents in
the town.262 There were still over 100 by the mid-1990s.263 Dur-
ing the 1980s, Western Nuclear installed over 50,000 feet of porous
wind fencing to protect the tailings.2" Nonetheless, a 1987 radio-
logical survey identified 170 acres on which wind blown tailings
had accumulated.265 These tailings deposits ranged in depth from
six inches to four feet.266 Finally, some ten years after milling had
stopped, the problem of blowing tailings was resolved when an
interim soil cover was placed over the tailings.267 There are also
questions about the long-term invulnerability of Western Nuclear's
tailings. Despite early objections by the EPA and the State of Wyo-
ming," the NRC has decided that the tailings will be reclaimed
where they stand, at the end of a natural drainage, a mile south of
the Sweetwater River.269
COMM., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: SPLIT ROCK URANIUM MILL 4-3, 4-5, 8-1
(Feb. 1980) [hereinafter SPLIT ROCK E.S.].
"' See infra notes 285-291 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 301-307.
26 Western Nuclear, Inc., Annual Report 1988 at 40 (Aug. 16, 1987 to May 31,
1988) (on file with archives, Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality [hereinafter
Wyo. DEQ]) [hereinafter Western Nuclear, Inc.].
26 See generally Amundson, supra note 44 (writing on the history of the town of
Jeffrey City).
'6 SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at 2-7. Amundson estimates that the popula-
tion of Jeffrey City grew from 2,500 in 1977 to over 4,000 by 1980. Amundson, supra
note 44, at 484, 495.
2" Norma Williamson, Company Eyes Jeffrey City Renewal: Effort Planned to Sell,
Rent Vacant Homes, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 1995, at BI.
26 Western Nuclear, Inc., supra note 260, at 42.
' Split Rock Uranium Mill, in EPA ASSESSMENT OF URANIUM MILL TAILING
PILES at 2 (Oct. 1991) (on file with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-9-67).
2 Western Nuclear, Inc., Split Rock Mill Tailings Regrading Report 1990 at 10
(Feb. 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, Docket No. 40-1162).
-6' id. at I1.
26' SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at A-15, A-44.
'69 Finding of No Significant Impact, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,285 (1993).
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Western Nuclear Inc. is a subsidiary of Phelps Dodge Inc., a
major copper mining and manufacturing company.27 The Split
Rock mill, the first built in Wyoming, was constructed in 1957.7 l
The mill is located between the Gas Hills and Crook's Gap uranium
mining districts in south central Wyoming. It served uranium mines
in both areas.272 The tailings impoundment was created by dam-
ming part of a natural drainage.273 In April 1977, 33 feet of the
dam was breached. This released about two million gallons of tail-
ings solution, all of which was contained inside the mill bound-
aries."" The dam was repaired and a new compacted tailings dam
constructed upstream from the existing dam.275 Today, the com-
bined disposal area covers 180 acres and contains approximately 7.7
million tons of tailings.
276
B. Groundwater Contamination
In the context of the mid-1950s, Western Nuclear's system for
disposing of tailings solution at its Split Rock mill was perfect.
"The idea in the old days was simply to get rid of it." 27 7 The un-
lined tailings pond was built over two deep paleo stream valleys that
had filled with sediment, the upper layer of which was sand and
alluvium. 27 Tailings liquid in the unlined pond simply leaked
through the sands into the aquifers beneath and was carried toward
the Sweetwater River a mile to the north.279 In 1980, when the
mill was still operating, the NRC estimated that contaminated water
was leaking from the tailings at a rate of about 1200 gallons per minute.'
170 THOMAS J. HILLIARD, MINING REPORT CARD FOR PHELPS DODGE CORPORATION
I (Mineral Policy Center Mining Accountability Project, 1993). See also OFFICE OF
RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL RULE FOR RADON-222
EMISSIONS FROM LICENSED URANIUM MILL TAILINGS at 40, 42 (Economic Analysis,
Aug. 1986).
"' SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at I-1. See generally, Amundson, supra note
44, at 486-93.
r SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at 1-3, 2-25.
" I d. at 2-13.
"14 Id. at 3-17, 5-5; Marjane Ambler, NRC Tailings Control Too Lax, Wyoming
Charges, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1979, at 10.
"' Split Rock Uranium Mill, supra note 265, at 1.
276 Id.
27 Interview with official, Div. of Land Quality, Wyoming Dept. of Envtl. Quality,
in Cheyenne, Wyo. (Aug. 11, 1988).
" GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION, supra note 255, at 54, 58-59.
79 See id. at 54, 55; Interview with official, supra note 277; SPLIT ROCK E.S.,
supra note 257, at 4-3.
290 SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at 4-3, C-2 to C-5.
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Over the years, an enormous mound of water formed under the
leaking tailings pond. 8' This mound created a gradient that caused
the plume of seepage to migrate down the two aquifer valleys (the
Northwest and Southwest Valleys).282 The principal contaminants
found in the underlying aquifers are radium-226, thorium-230, lead-
210, polonium-210, uranium, and arsenic.283
Operations ceased in 1981 with the collapse of the uranium
market.284 The mill never resumed production, although it re-
mained on stand-by status until 1986. In 1986, Western Nuclear
informed the state and the NRC of their intent to reclaim.285 The
first reclamation plan they proposed was to shut off the collection
pumps so the tailings could dry.286 These pumps had been return-
ing seepage to the tailings pond and, in the process, rewetting the
tailings.287 Once dried, the tailings would be covered. Western Nu-
clear did not plan to resume pumping the aquifer. Instead, the com-
pany proposed that natural geochemical and hydrologic processes be
allowed to mitigate past groundwater contamination.288 The NRC,
which had suggested in 1980 that such a plan might be feasible,
289
allowed Western Nuclear to shut off its pumps.29 However, when
contamination increased in the aquifers, Western Nuclear was told
to develop a plan that would remove contaminants from the aqui-
fers.291' This task has proved very difficult.
" See Letter from Stephanie Baker, Western Nuclear, Inc., to Ramon Hall, NRC,
Uranium Recovery Field Office, Denver, Colo., attach, at I (June 29, 1990) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 9009050146).
22d.; GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION, supra note 255, at 64-70.
, GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION, supra note 255, at 55.
Mark Moxley, Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality Annual Inspection Report, Western
Nuclear, Inc. 3 (Sept. 17, 1987) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
285 Id.
26 See Memorandum from Candice Jierree, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-1162, at 1 (June 16, 1987) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ). See
also Letter from Terence Kippen, Western Nuclear, Inc., to Edward Hawkins, NRC
Region IV, at 3, 4 (Aug. 31, 1989) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8910050141).
... See Memorandum from Candice Jierree to Docket File No. 40-1162, supra note
286, at 1.
266 See Letter from Terence Kippen to Edward Hakins, supra note 286, at 3-6;
letter from Stephanie Baker, Western Nuclear, Inc., to R. Dale Smith, NRC Region IV,
at 2 (Apr. 8, 1988) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8804280290).
2. SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at 4-3, 4-5, 8-1.
2. Memorandum from Candice Jierree to Docket File No. 40-1162, supra note 286,
at 1.
293 Letter from Terence Kippen to Edward Hawkins, supra note 286, at 4, 5. See
Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to Docket File
No. 40-1162 at 1, 2 (Mar. 21, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9104030287).
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The principal problems Western Nuclear must deal with in its
groundwater restoration effort are too much prior seepage and too
much water. In 1990, seepage was flowing from the mound of con-
taminants underneath the tailings pond at 334 gallons per minute
(gpm) in the Northwest Valley aquifer, and 51 gpm in the South-
west Valley aquifer. 292 A newly installed pumping system was ex-
tracting groundwater from the contaminated aquifers at an average
rate of 68 gpm (20 percent of the seepage rate) in the Northwest
Valley, and 38 gpm (75 percent of the seepage rate) in the South-
west Valley. 3 The rate of seepage exceeded the rate of collection.
In addition, not all of the water pumped from the aquifer was from
the plume of contaminants. Some was recharge coming from the
Sweetwater River alluvium aquifer. 94
Through vigorous pumping some progress has been made in
decreasing the mound of seepage underneath the tailings pond. 95
Improvements in water quality have been less promising. In 1993,
NRC concluded that "there was a slight reduction in hazardous
constituent concentrations associated with initial seepage recovery
efforts. Following this, hazardous constituent concentrations remain
elevated, but have stayed at rather constant levels."
' 96
One definite improvement is that water and seepage collected
by the pumps are no longer returned to the tailings pond where the
contamination could leak back into the aquifer. This contaminated
water now goes to lined storage ponds where it is fed into an en-
larged evaporation spray mist system. 297 The spray system evapo-
rates up to 66 million gallons of contaminated water a year.298 In
Letter from Stephanie Baker to Ramon Hall, supra note 281, atttach. at 1.
293 id.
294 Id.
291 Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-1162, at 2 (Oct. 18, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9011050195); Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-1162, at 2 (Feb. 5, 1993) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9302220427) [hereinafter Memorandum of Feb. 5, 1993].
296 Memorandum of Feb. 5, 1993, supra note 295, at 2. See also Letter from
Stephanie Baker, Western Nuclear, Inc., to Director, Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards, NRC Region IV, at I (Sept. 9, 1994) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9409270094); letter from Stephanie Baker, Western Nuclear, Inc., to Joseph Holonich,
Chief, NRC High Level Waste and Uranium Recovery Projects Branch I (Mar. 1, 1995)
(on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9503090008).
297 Letter from Stephanie Baker (accompanying Annual Groundwater Corrective
Action Program Review), to Ramon Hall, Director , NRC Uranium Recovery Field
Office, Denver, Colo., enclosure at 2-3 (Dec. 15, 1992) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN.
9303110277).
Memorandum of Feb. 5, 1993, supra note 295, at I, 2.
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winter months, recovered contaminated water is stored in two lined
ponds to await summer evaporation.299 By 1991, an interim soil
cover also had been placed over the dried and recontoured tail-
ings. 3°° This cover should prevent further leaching of tailings from
melting snow or rain.
There are, however, two factors which raise doubt about the
commitment of the NRC and Western Nuclear to long-term ground-
water restoration. Western Nuclear has estimated costs for ground-
water cleanup at only $78,600.31 These estimates have been ac-
cepted by the NRC as the basis for the bond the company must post
to assure that groundwater reclamation will be completed.3 2 This
small sum hardly represents a financial guaranty. In New Mexico,
the NRC has required bonding levels for groundwater clean-up for
Homestake which are over one hundred times as high ($8 mil-
lion);3. 3 for UNC, which are forty times as high (aproximately
$2.6 million);3" and for Quivira, which are over twelve times as
high ($1 million).3 5
Also in 1992, without explanation, the NRC accepted, and
published in the Federal Register, December 1994 as Western
Nuclear's fum date for completion of its groundwater corrective
action program." When 1994 arrived, the date was changed to
1996." Neither this overly optimistic date for final remediation
nor the small surety are indicative of a long-term commitment to
groundwater restoration. Yet, Western Nuclear has one of the most
severe groundwater contamination problems of the mills studied.
" Letter from Stephanie Baker to Ramon Hall, supra note 297, at 2, 3.
3w Western Nuclear, Inc., supra note 266, at 11; Memorandum from Dana Ward,
Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to Docket File No. 40-1162, at 2 (Apr. 27, 1992) (on
file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9205120190).
" Western Nuclear, Inc., 1990 GROUND WATER CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM
REVIEW at 6, 7 (Oct. 1, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9011150075). These
estimates did not include costs for pumps and the evaporation system that had already
been installed. Id.
32 See Memorandum from Paul Michaud, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-1162 (Annual Surety Review), at 1 (Nov. 29, 1990) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 9012100186).
I3 1 AK GEOCONSULT, supra note 156, tbl. 6.
Memorandum from Raymond 0. Gonzales et al. to Docket File No. 40-8907,
supra note 183, at 21.
303 Memorandum from Dawn Jacoby et al. to Docket File No. 40-8905, supra note
222, at 25.
'06 Western Nuclear, Inc., Reclamation Schedules, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,482 (1992).
o' Notice of Amendment to Change Reclamation Milestone Dates, Western Nuclear,
Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 46,455 (1994).
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C. Questions About Flood Dangers
The Split Rock tailings impoundment is one mile from the
Sweetwater River."8 This river is an important source of water for
agriculture and wildlife in semiarid south central Wyoming. The
river eventually joins the North Platte River which then flows
through Casper, Wyoming.
The Split Rock tailings are being reclaimed in place and will
not be moved away from the river.' In 1979, during the environ-
mental review for renewal of Western Nuclear's license, EPA ar-
gued that the "existing tailings impoundment should be abandoned
and replaced by an impoundment constructed and operated in accor-
dance with the disposal requirements for new mills, and should
include relocation of existing tailings."3 ' The State of Wyoming
noted in its comments that "the alternative of removing tailings to
mined-out pits was not adequately considered."3 ' The NRC, citing
impracticability and costs, rejected both comments and noted that
transporting the tailings would involve health and environmental
risks.312 The NRC also presented data from Western Nuclear that
showed "flood waters from the maximum thunderstorm over the
Sweetwater River basin would not reach the tailings pond embank-
ment."3"' This same study by the company also showed that a
maximum precipitation event over the 470-acre drainage area behind
the tailings embankment would not overtop the embankment or
affect its stability.3"4
VIII. CASE 5: AMERICAN NUCLEAR CORPORATION GAS HILLS
URANIUM MILL, WYOMING
A. Introduction
In May 1994, American Nuclear Corporation announced that it
SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at 2-13, 2-14.
Finding of No Significant Impact, supra note 269, at 33,285.
310 SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at A-15.
3" id. at A-44.
312 Id. at 10-1, A-15, A-44.
313 Id. at 5-4. See also Memorandum from Raymond Gonzales, Project Manager,
NRC Region IV, to Docket File No. 40-1162, at 5-8 (Mar. 25, 1994) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 9404280059).
314 SPLIT ROCK E.S., supra note 257, at 5-4. See also Memorandum from Raymond
Gonzales, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to Docket File No. 40-1162, supra note
313, at 5, 10-12.
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was discharging its employees, discontinuing operations immediate-
ly, and going out of business."5 The company was unable to meet
payments on a $2.3 million mortgage. 16 The state of Wyoming
held the reclamation bond for the site, an arrangement allowed by
the NRC.31 7 The bond to guarantee reclamation of the tailings was
worth approximately $3.2 million. Most of the bond was in the form
of liquid investments in a trust account.3 ' This bond has now
been forfeited.319 The state of Wyoming will reclaim the site.
There is some question, however, if the bond will fully cover the
costs of remaining reclamation work.32 If the bond is insufficient,
federal monies provided by recent legislation to help the uranium
industry may make up the difference.32
American Nuclear's mill site is located in the heart of the re-
mote Gas Hills uranium mining district, some 20 miles north of
Jeffrey City and 45 miles southeast of Riverton. American Nuclear
was one of the independent uranium companies which emerged
during Wyoming's first uranium boom in the 1950s.322 The mill
began operation in 1959 as the Federal American Partners' Gas
Hills Mill.323 American Nuclear was the managing partner, and
later became the operating contractor when the mill was leased by
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).324 Mill operations were sus-
pended by TVA in 1981.325
3' Letter from William Salisbury, President, American Nuclear Corp., to William
Brown, Regional Counsel, NRC Region IV, at 1, attachment at I (May 9, 1994) (on file
with NRCIPDR, ACN. 9405250145).
316 Letter from William Salisbury, President, American Nuclear Corp., to Director,
Office of Enforcement, NRC 4 (May 25, 1994) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9406100276).
"' Letter from Edward Hawkins, NRC Region IV, to Niles Andrus, American
Nuclear Corporation 3, 4 (Aug. 11, 1987) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8708190166).
318 Letter from William Salisbury to Director, supra note 316, at 2.
3W9 Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, Order for Bond Forfeiture, Docket File
No. 2557-94 (Oct. 5, 1994) (on file with NRC/PRD, ACN. 9410280059).
32 In late 1995 the State of Wyoming estimated reclamation costs at American
Nuclear to be between $5 million and $6 million, not including cost of cleaning up
contaminated groundwater. Chris Tollefson, Uranium Cleanup Funding Uncertain, CASPER
STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 1995, at A4. See also infra note 345.
321 See infra text accompanying notes 361-370; Tollefson, supra note 320, at A4.
3.. Letter from William Salisbury to William Brown, supra note 315, attach. at 1.
a3 3 FINAL GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 73, at T-10.
"' Memorandum from Mark Moxley, Land Quality, District 2 Supervisor, to Dennis
Hemmer, Director, Wyoming DEQ, ANC Bond Forfeiture Recommendation I (May 24,
1994) (on file with files Wyo. DEQ).
32' Federal-American Partners/American Nuclear Corporation, in EPA ASSESSMENT
OF URANIUM MILL TAILING PILES at 1 (Oct. 1991) (on file with EPA Air Docket,
Docket No. A-91-67); Western Roundup, HIGH COuNTRY NEWS, Mar. 6, 1981.
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After the mill shut down, TVA sold the mines associated with
the property.326 In 1985 under a contractual agreement with TVA,
American Nuclear became the sole owner and assumed all reclama-
tion liability for the mill site.327 In 1990 Cycle Resources Invest-
ment Corporation, a subsidiary of the German corporation NUKEM,
purchased aproximately 30% of American Nuclear's outstanding
company stock. 28
Tailings at American Nuclear were deposited in slurry form in
an unlined tailings pond.32 9 Liquids from this impoundment were
decanted into an unlined evaporation pond.30 Both of these tail-
ings impoundments were built by placing an earthen dam across a
dry drainage.33' The main tailings impoundment holds approxi-
mately 6.7 million cubic yards of tailings.332 The evaporation pond
holds aproximately 1.3 million cubic yards of tailings.333 Together,
the two impoundments contain about 5.4 million metric tons of
tailings and cover 117 acres.334
American Nuclear has a long history of seepage from its evap-
oration ponds.35 The evaporation pond is underlain by a shallow
aquifer composed of recent alluvial deposits and weathered sand-
stone. There is a deeper aquifer below.336 A 1980 study of ground-
water contamination indicated seepage had migrated into the shallow
aquifer and spread 2,000 to 3,000 feet from the evaporation
pond.337 A system of six wells to collect seepage and pump it back
into the pond was installed in 1978.338 However, by 1987, only
3 Memorandum from Mark Moxley to Dennis Hemmer, supra note 324, at 1, 2.
I" d. at 1. See also Memorandum from Rick Nevin, ICF Incorporated, to Ken
Hooks NMSS, Review and Analysis of American Nuclear Corporation Financial Docu-
ments 2 (July 12, 1994) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9407220284).
"' Memorandum from Rick Nevin to Ken Hooks, supra note 327, at 2.
3"9 3 FINAL GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 73, at T-10; GROUND WATER CONTAMINA-
TION, supra note 255, at 72.
'm 3 FINAL GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 73, at T-10; Federal-American Part-
ners/American Nuclear Corporation, supra note 325, at 1.
"' 3 FINAL GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 73, at T-10. See Federal-American Part-
ners/American Nuclear Corporation, supra note 325, at 1.
... Letter from William Salisbury, American Nuclear, to Irwin Dickstein, Region
VIII, EPA, Denver 2 (Dec. 20, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9101150121).
333 id.
3" Joint Hearing, supra note 47, at 197; 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS,
supra note 28, at 9-10.
... See GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION, supra note 255, at 72.
33 id.
337 id.
33' AMERICAN NUCLEAR CORPORATION, AMENDMENT APPLICATION 5 (1987) (re-
sponse to NRC's Aug. 11, 1987 comment letter) (on file with NRC/PDR, DKT. 40-
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one well was producing enough water to operate a pump.339
B. Financial Difficulties and Reclamation Delays
Throughout the late 1980s reclamation proceeded very slowly
at American Nuclear Corporation. Although milling stopped in the
early 1980s it was not until 1990 that an interim soil cover was
placed over both tailings ponds.3" One reason for the delay was
that American Nuclear lacked the cash to finance reclamation.34'
To speed up reclamation, the State of Wyoming, with the approval
of the NRC, began to rebate bond money to American Nuclear when-
ever a particular piece of reclamation work was completed.3 42 Be-
tween 1988 and 1990 a million dollars of the bond money held by
the state was returned to American Nuclear.343 In retrospect, these
frequent rebates were probably a poor idea. American Nuclear went
out of business in 1994 with considerable reclamation work left
undone. Release of a million dollars of bond money did not even
produce much reclamation once the interim soil cover was in place.
In 1994 the state concluded that "no significant reclamation work
has been conducted under this permit since 1990.''""
It does not appear that the remaining bond money will cover
the costs to the state of reclamation.345 In addition, none of the
4492).
..9 Id. at 7.
3" Letter from Ramon Hall, Director, Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC, to Jack
Ferguson, President, American Nuclear Corporation app. at 3 (Sept. 28, 1990) (on file
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9010100090).
"' Letter from Dennis Hemmer, Director, Wyo. DEQ, to Ramon Hall, Director,
NRC, Uranium Recovery Field Office, Denver, Colo. 1 (June 18, 1990) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 9007180196). See also Firm Eyes Gas Hills for Hazardous Waste,
CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 1989, at A3.
.41 See Letter from Dennis Hemmer to Ramon Hall, supra note 341, at 1, 2; Letter
from Dennis Hemmer, Director, Wyo. DEQ, to Ramon Hall, Director, NRC, Uranium
Recovery Field Office, Denver, Colo. 1 (July 26, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9009040172); Mark Moxley, Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, Annual Inspection Report,
American Nuclear 2 (June 22, 1989) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
... See Moxley, supra note 342, at 2, 3; Memorandum from Paul Michaud, Project
Manager, NRC Region IV, to Docket File No. 40-4492, at 1, 2 (Feb. 6, 1990) (on file
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9003010496).
3" WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, NOTICE OF VIOLATION,
Docket File No. 2557-94 (1994) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
" Tollefson, supra note 320. The sufficiency of American Nuclear's bond in part
depends upon whether or not they will have to conform to erosion protection guidelines
issued by NRC in 1990. Memorandum from Mark Moxley to Dennis Hemmer, supra
note 324, at 2. In 1991 American Nuclear claimed that reclamation costs would be
raised by several million dollars if they were forced to place additional amounts of
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calculations used to determine American Nuclear's bond included
the costs of restoring groundwater.3" This omission likely is due
to the inexpensive pump system in use. Because of low recharge of
water to the aquifer American Nuclear was using only a one-third
horsepower pump to pump the aquifer. 47 The cost was probably
considered insignificant when figuring the bond. Cost may have
been minimal, but so too was progress. More than ten years of
pumping had lowered the groundwater table and isolated the tailings
in an unsaturated zone,3  but water quality had not improved. In
1991 the NRC reported that a comparison of water quality for 1989
and 1991 showed "an increase in all monitored hazardous constitu-
ents with the exception of uranium."349 In mid-1993 NRC noted
that all groundwater standards except cyanide were exceeded at the
monitor well down-gradient of the facility.3 " The State of Wyo-
ming is now reclaiming the tailings at American Nuclear. Faced
with a difficult long-term groundwater restoration effort, they have
chosen a familiar remedy. The state has asked NRC to approve an
earlier request by American Nuclear for Alternate Concentration
Limits.33'
protective rock (riprap) over the reclaimed tailings. This rock was not available locally
and would be expensive to truck in. James L. Grant and Associates, Erosion Stability
Evaluation, American Nuclear Corporation 2 (1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9111190454).
" See, e.g., Memorandum from Mark Moxley, Dist. II Supervisor, Wyo. DEQ, to
File, Permit No. 352, American Nuclear, Inc. 1 (Nov. 8, 1988) (on file with archives,
Wyo. DEQ); Memorandum from Paul Michaud to Docket File No. 40-4492, supra note
343 at 2; Letter from William Salisbury, American Nuclear Corporation, to Ramon Hall,
NRC, Region IV at I, attach. at 20-22 (Apr. 16, 1992) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN.
9205050307).
341 AMERICAN NUCLEAR CORPORATION, CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM, 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (Jan. 28, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9204140254). Ameri-
can Nuclear feared that they were going to be required to drill new wells in order to
find fresh water with which to flush the aquifer. Instead, NRC agreed to the low volume
pumping system. See id.; AMERICAN NUCLEAR CORPORATION, supra note 338, at 8.
34 AMERICAN NUCLEAR CORPORATION, supra note 347, at 2.
" Memorandum from Gary Konwinski to Docket No. 40-4492, Review of the
Alternate Concentration Limit Proposal 6 (Aug. 28, 1991) (on file with NRCIPDR, DKT.
40-4492). According to American Nuclear, comparisons with earlier periods were difficult
because many of the files had been lost or destroyed, first, when the office was moved
from the Gas Hills to Riverton, Wyo., and then during the decommissioning of the mill
in the Gas Hills. AMERICAN NUCLEAR CORPORATION, supra note 347, at 2.
" Memorandum from Cynthia Miller-Corbett, Project Manager, Region IV, NRC, to
Docket File No. 40-4492, at 2 (Dec. 21, 1993) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN.
9402240136). Inexplicably, in 1992, NRC accepted, and published in the Federal Regis-
ter, a projected date of December, 1994, for completion of groundwater corrective actions
at American Nuclear. See American Nuclear Corp., Reclamation Schedules, 57 Fed. Reg.
23,436, (1992).
... Telephone Interview, supra note 218. See also Letter from Joseph Holonich,
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C. Private Waste Dumps: Hopes for New Profits
Another reason little reclamation took place at American Nu-
clear after 1990 was that the company's attention was focused on a
new venture. American Nuclear hoped to make Gas Hills a private
waste depository.352 NUKEM, who had purchased 30% of Ameri-
can Nuclear's stock, installed a new president for this purpose. He
shifted most of American Nuclear's effort to developing a waste
disposal business. 3"
In 1992, Wyoming granted American Nuclear a "de minimis"
exemption to the state's solid waste regulations. 354 American Nu-
clear was given the right to import and commercially dispose of
10,000 cubic yards (about 21,900 short tons) of uranium mining
wastes to be placed in existing tailings impoundments. 55 This
waste was generated at in situ mines that leach uranium, and was
similar to the wastes produced at American Nuclear.3 6 NRC want-
ed to avoid the proliferation of waste sites357 and had given early
approval to American Nuclear's new business venture.35
American Nuclear's plans to expand this disposal operation
were dashed when the state turned down a request for a "de mini-
mis" exemption from Pathfinder Mines to import 800,000 tons of
uranium mining waste.359 In announcing the rejection of the Path-
Chief, High-Level Waste and Uranium Recovery Projects Branch, NRC, to Richard
Chancellor, Wyo. DEQ I (Sept. 27, 1994) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9410040206).
352 See Firm Eyes Gas Hills for Hazardous Waste, supra note 341, at A3; Letter
from John Ferguson, President, American Nuclear Corporation, to Ramon Hall, Director,
Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC Region IV at 1 (Mar. 21, 1991) (on file with
NRCIPDR, ACN. 9104240075).
... Memorandum from Rick Nevin to Ken Hooks, supra note 327, at 2-3.
" Hugh Jackson, American Nuclear Hopes to Import Waste to Pay Debt, CASPER
STAR-TRIBUNE, Nov. 18, 1993, at Cl.
.. Id.; Ray E. Harris, Industrial Minerals and Uranium Update, Wyo. GEo-NOTES,
Feb. 1994, at 38.
" Jackson, supra note 354, at CI. See also Letter from John Ferguson to Ramon
Hall, supra note 352, at 1-2; 1 DRAFT GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 52 (on in-situ min-
ing).
3V Dan Whipple, Gas Hills Uranium Mill Site to Receive Radioactive Waste,
CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1990, at A3 (comments by Ed Hawkins, NRC Region
IV); 10 C.F.R. §40, app. A, at criterion 2 (1995). For NRC's position on what wastes
may and may not be put into a uranium mill tailings impoundment, see Uranium Mill
Facilities, Request for Public Comments on Section 1 le(2) Byproduct Material in Tailings
Impoundments, 57 Fed. Reg. 20,525 (1992).
" Memorandum from Rick Nevin to Ken Hooks, supra note 327, at 3; Whipple,
supra note 357, at A3.
'" Hugh Jackson, DEQ Rejects Big Pathfinder Waste Request, CASPER STAR-TRI-
BUNE, Mar. 23, 1993, at Al, A8. See generally Betty Stroock, 'De minimis' Radioactive
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finder request, a top state official said that Wyoming had probably
made a mistake when it approved the first exemption for American
Nuclear.3"e
D. A Federal Bailout for the Uranium Milling Industry
After years of debate, in 1992 Congress finally passed legisla-
tion to help the uranium milling industry.36' Companies that milled
uranium under government contract were made eligible for federal
reimbursement for the costs of reclaiming tailings produced under
government contract.362 The ostensible reason for the financial re-
bate is that government contracts did not require reclamation and
did not include specific reimbursement for reclamation costs."
These same arguments for government help had been made and
rejected in the late 1970s when UMTRCA was being debated.3
At the time, however, uranium prices were at an all time high and
reclamation costs were not seen as a major problem for the indus-
try."' After the severe economic reverses of the early 1980s legis-
lation was introduced almost every year to aid the beleaguered ura-
nium industry.3" Title X of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was
the first tangible result of these efforts.367
Tonnage-de What?, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 15, 1993, at A9.
360 Jackson, supra note 354, at Cl. Pathfinder had already received authorization
from the NRC to greatly expand the type and amount of waste it could accept at its
Shirley Basin mill tailings impoundment. Hugh Jackson, Competitor Jealous of Pathfind-
er, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 1993, at Al, A10. In 1994, Wyoming announced
that, to avoid an expensive legal battle with Pathfinder, the State would agree to a de
minimis exemption for 78,000 tons of uranium mining wastes. Hugh Jackson, DEQ Seeks
to Expand Pathfinder Waste Dump, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 2, 1994, at Al, AIO.
"' Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 1001-1004, 106 StaL 2776,
2946-48 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2296(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
3" See id. See also H.R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 at 145, 205
(1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 2028.
313 H.R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 205 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2028. See also David Hackett, Lobbyists Say Wallop Tried to Shift
Nuke Costs to Public, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 19, 1992, at Al, AI0 (comments by
John Atkins, Cogema, Inc.).
314 See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 29, 30 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7456, 7457. See also supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
UMTRCA specifically prohibited the spending of federal funds designated to clean up
abandoned mill sites at mill sites that were still licensed. 42 U.S.C. § 7925(a) (1988);
Grammer, supra note 13, at 487-88.
36' See, e.g., I DRAFr GENERIC E.1.S., supra note 36, at 17 (where the NRC esti-
mates that the costs of covering tailings to achieve a 2 pCi/m'/s radon emission level
would be from .5 percent to I percent of the value of the yellowcake obtained).
36 See supra note 120.
3" Title X of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) contains §§
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There are thirteen mills where tailings created under govern-
ment contracts prior to 1970 are commingled with tailings generated
under later private contracts. The tailings produced under govern-
ment contracts at these mills make up from 12% to 63% of the total
tailings to be reclaimed.368 Companies will be eligible for a reim-
bursement for documented costs of the portion of the tailings pro-
duced for the government up to $5.50 per dry short ton of tailings
reclaimed.3" One of the last acts of the management at American
Nuclear before closing the company was to file for a federal Title X
reimbursement of $900,000."70 American Nuclear was one of only
a few companies that needed financial help to complete reclamation.
Yet, even with the enactment of this federal assistance, the company
still went out of business. Most of the other uranium mills are sub-
sidiaries of healthy, diversified companies which are quite capable
of financing reclamation. 7' These companies will now be eligible
for a welcome, but unneeded, federal reimbursement. The reim-
bursement is even retroactive. Companies that had completed most
of their reclamation before passage of the law are also eligible for
the reimbursement.
3 72
1001-1004 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 (Supp. V 1993)) and has become the com-
mon appelation for this federal rebate to private uranium companies.
' The metric tonnage milled under government contract and the percentage of the
total tailings to be reclaimed that these government milled tailings represent are as
follows: TVA-Edgemont (S.D.) 1.6 million metric tons, 50% of total tonnage; Atlas
Corp. (Ut.) 6 mil. m. tons, 63%; Amer. Nuc. Corp. (Wy.) 2.1 mil. m. tons, 39%;
Petrotomics (Wy.) 0.7 mil. m. tons, 12%; Umetco (Wy.) 2.1 mil. m. tons, 24%; West.
Nuc. Inc. (Wy.) 3.4 mil. m. tons, 49%; Pathfinder (Lucky Mc mill) 2.7 mil. m. tons,
25%; Anaconda-Bluewater (N.M.) 8.8 mil. m. tons, 37%; Homestake (N.M.) 11.4 mil. m.
tons, 52%; Quivira (N.M.) 10 mil. m. tons, 30%; Dawn Mining (Wa.) 1.1 mil. m. tons,
38%; Cotter Corp. (Co.) 0.3 mil. m. tons, 12%; Umetco (Co.) 5.7 mil. m. tons, 54%.
See Joint Hearing, supra note 47, at 197.
36 42 U.S.C. § 2296(a) (Supp. V 1993). The total payments to these thirteen
uranium licensees cannot exceed $270 million, adjusted for inflation. 1d. This money
must be appropriated by Congress. It is not an entitlement. In late 1993 the President
signed the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, which appropriated $41.7 million for
tailings cleanup by uranium licensees. Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-316, 108 Stat. 1715 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2061 (Supp.
V 1993)).
"o Letter from William Salisbury to Director, supra note 316, at 5.
3"' This point has been made by several commentators. See Hackney, supra note
114, at 196 n.194; Domestic Uranium Industry and Enrichment Program: Hearings on
H.R. 4934 and H.R. 5181 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 209 (1988) (comments by
Representative Mike Synar).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2296(a)-3(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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IX. CASE 6: PATHFINDER MINES CORPORATION'S LUCKY Mc
URANIUM MILL, WYOMING
A. Introduction
Pathfinder Mines' Lucky Mc mill is located adjacent to Ameri-
can Nuclear's mill in the Gas Hills uranium producing area of Wyo-
ming. These two mills have faced similar problems in groundwater
restoration. Similarities end there, however. Pathfinder Mines is a
part of COGEMA, a French energy conglomerate.373 This corpo-
rate connection gives Pathfinder Mines access to finances and exper-
tise that were not available to financially strapped American Nuc-le-
ar. Groundwater clean-up at Pathfinder Mines also has benefited
from an unusual resolve to overcome problems other mills saw as
too difficult.
B. Groundwater Contamination
Lucky Mc mill stored tailings in a series of six ponds created
by building clay core earthen dams down a ravine.374 The first
three ponds nearest the mill held saturated coarse grained tailings
and the last three only liquids.375 In 1963 a flood caused tailings to
go over one of the dams, spilling 23 million gallons.376 After-
wards, a new dam enlarged the capacity of the ponds.3" The main
seepage problem at the Lucky Mc mill came from the two tailings
ponds (1 and 2) nearest the mill. In 1984, Wyoming's Chief Hy-
drologist explained:
It appears that the major problem remaining at this site is the
... See Ray E. Harris, Uranium Update, Wyo. GEo-NoTEs, May 1994, at 35, 36
(information on COGEMA's corporate structure).
3, See Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-2259, at 1-3 (June 11, 1984) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
... PATHFINDER MINES CORP., LUCKY MCMINE, SUPPLEMENT TO APPLICANT'S
ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, at I-I, 1-2 (1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9211300237).
376 3 FINAL GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 73, at T-10.
" See id.; Memorandum from Gary Konwinski to Docket File No. 40-2259, supra
note 374, at 3. In the late 1980's, the Lucky McMill had over 12 million tons of
tailings which covered more than 200 acres. See PATHFINDER, SOURCE MATERIAL LI-
CENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, LUCKY MC URANIUM
MILL 23 (Nov. 1989) (on file with NRC/PDR, DKT. 40-2259); Statement of Bob Poyser,
testifying before the Envtl. Protection Agency, Pathfinder Mines, Regarding Proposed
Rulemaking for 40 C.F.R. § 192(D) (1995), at 2 (Jan. 21, 1992) (on file with EPA Air
Docket, Docket No. A-91-67).
[VOL. 1 1: 1
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
unreclaimed status of Tailings Ponds No. 1 and No. 2. Although
these ponds are no longer used, they continue to impound surface
water runoff which continues to recharge the ground-water mound
beneath the ponds. Additionally, a ditch which apparently carries
laboratory wastes, etc. still transgresses Tailings Pond No. I there-
by providing additional water and contaminants for recharge.378
At a 1984 meeting, the state and NRC "agreed that we must
get Pathfinder moving on closing up tailings cells 1 and 2.""9
However, Pathfinder's on and off plans to resume operations and
reuse these ponds made it difficult to get reclamation underway."'
It was not until 1989 that both ponds received interim covers.3"'
When finally in place, these covers prevented melting snow from
leaching tailings into the aquifer below.
In 1980 Pathfinder installed collection wells to intercept seep-
age from the ponds and limit its migration through the underlying
alluvium.382 Water and seepage collected by these wells was not
pumped back to the leaking ponds, as was done at other mills. Rath-
er, it was pumped to the pond furthest downgrade for evapora-
tion."' This last tailings pond was constructed with a fine-grained
shale to prevent leakage.38 4
Pumping of the aquifer had more effect on the quantity than
quality of water. This was the same problem found at American
Nuclear. By 1989 yields from pumping at Lucky Mc mill had de-
creased from an initial 21 gpm to only 10 gpm of seepage. 85 By
3" Memorandum from Bill Kearney, Chief Hydrologist, Wyo. DEQ, to File, Path-
finder Mines Corp., Lucky Mc Mine I (Mar. 7, 1984) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
8404100116).
" Letter from Rick Engelmann, Dist. I1, Engineer, Wyo. DEQ, to Dr. Harry
Pettengill, NRC, Uranium Recovery Field Office, Denver, Colo. 1 (Apr. 2, 1984) (on file
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8405140224).
380 See PATHFINDER, supra note 377, at 23. See Letter from T.W. Hardgrove,
Environmental Coordinator, Lucky Mc Mine, to Edward Hawkins, NRC, Uranium Recov-
ery Field Office, Denver, Colo. 1, attach, at I (May 3, 1989) (on file with NRC/PDR,
ACN. 8906090095).
31, See Letter from T.W. Hardgrove to Edward Hawkins, supra note 380, attach. at
2-4; Statement of Bob Poyser, supra note 377, at 2.
... See PATHFINDER, supra note 377, at 8.
... See Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-2259, at 1 (Dec. 16, 1988) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN.
8901300212).
384 Id.
' See Letter from T.W. Hardgrove, Environmental Coordinator, Lucky Mc Mine, to
Edward Hawkins, NRC Uranium Recovery Field Office, Denver 1 (Mar. 1, 1989) (on
file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8903210412); Memorandum for Docket File No. 40-2259,
from Candice Jierree, Project Manager, NRC Region IV at 2 (Mar. 27, 1987) (on file
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Pathfinder's own admission, "unfortunately, pumping has not re-
sulted in any real improvement in water quality in the aquifer east
of the two ponds .... Pumping has, at best, only held the line on
water quality for the past 8 years. In some instances, there has been
even further degradation in water quality."3"6 NRC analysis in
1988 concluded that groundwater protection standards were exceed-
ed for arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, nickel, combined
radium-226 and 228, thorium-230, selenium, and uranium. 387 This
is essentially the situation which exists today at American Nuclear.
At the Pathfinder mill, however, the company set about to resolve
the contamination problem.
C. Successes in Cleaning-up Groundwater
Pumping of groundwater at several mills has been hampered by
low recharge rates and diminishing amounts of water. However,
hazardous constituents remain to contaminate the water during aqui-
fer recharge. 88 When confronted with this situation, companies
typically argue that further restoration efforts are useless and stan-
dards should be eased.8 9 Pathfinder took a different approach. In
the late 1980s it announced "we have elected not to pursue the op-
tion of alternate concentration limits (ACLs) at this time. We feel
that the pursuit of aquifer remediation should take precedent at this
site at this time."3" Consultants hired by Pathfinder confirmed that
the problem was a lack of water to flush contaminants.
The constituents that have already migrated east of the ponds will
continue to be present in elevated concentrations for the duration
of any practical time frame one wants to consider as long as the
required medium for their removal is in short supply. That medi-
um is water, and at this site it is obvious that any source of natu-
ral recharge is very limited. 9'
Drying and covering the tailings would stop new contaminants
from entering the aquifer but would not clean up contamination
already present. Pathfinder therefore developed a new groundwater
with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8704070060).
6 Letter from T.W. Hardgrove to Edward Hawkins, supra note 385, at 1, 2.
... Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-2259, at 1 (Aug. 18, 1988) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
3 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., supra the cases of UNC and American Nuclear Corp.
i"0 Letter from T.W. Hardgrove to Edward Hawkins, supra note 385, at 2.
391 id.
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plan to attack past contamination. In May 1989 a fresh water injec-
tion system was added.392 Fresh water from a well was piped to
two injection wells and then pumped into the aquifer at roughly 26
gpm.393 The plan was that this fresh water would flush out contam-
inants.3 94 With fresh water injection the collection wells could
again remove water and hazardous constituents from the aquifer. 9
Results from this fresh water injection are promising. In 1991
NRC noted that "[s]elenium, radium-226 and 228, thorium-230,
cadmium, and chromium have shown some decreases in concentra-
tions." '396 By 1993 NRC could state that "[t]he combination of
fresh water injection and ground-water recovery have had a favor-
able effect on groundwater quality." '397 Pathfinder reported contin-
ued progress in December 1994 and indicated that groundwater stan-
dards would probably be reached, with possible exceptions for nick-
el and uranium.3'9
Pathfinder's efforts provide one of the few success stories in
groundwater clean-up under UMTRCA Title II. Even with initial
success, Pathfinder's projected date for completion of its groundwai-
ter clean-up is September 2004. 9 In addition to finances, a suc-
cessful remediation effort also requires perseverance. Pathfinder
brought both to its task. In American Nuclear's case, money was a
missing factor. Other companies with adequate funds have been
unwilling to see groundwater remediation as a long-term endeavor.
NRC has encouraged this lack of commitment to effective clean-up
by allowing companies to publish unrealistic clean-up dates in the
Federal Register which obviously cannot be met without easing
standards.
392 PATHFINDER, supra note 377, at 8.
31 Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV,to Docket
File No. 40-2259, at I (Mar. 16, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9004040155).
-" See id. at 1-3.
' See id. In 1989, Pathfinder also drilled new collection wells in tailings pond I
to pump seepage from directly underneath the tailings pond. See PATHFINDER, supra note
377, at 8.
"9 Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-2259, at 2 (Mar. 11, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9103190316).
'97 Memorandum from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV, to
Docket File No. 40-2259, at 3 (Mar. 30, 1993) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9304090298).
'" Letter from T.W. Hardgrove, Environmental Coordinator, Lucky Mc Mine, to
Joseph Holonich, Chief, NRC, High-Level Waste and Uranium Recovery Projects Branch,
Rockville, MD 1 (Dec. 22, 1994) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9501030093).
9' Pathfinder Mines Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 43,265 (1992).
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X. CASE 7: KENNECOTT URANIUM COMPANY'S SWEETWATER
URANIUM MILL, WYOMING
A. Introduction
The Sweetwater uranium mill was built as a state of the art
uranium operation in the late 1970s by Minerals Explorations Com-
pany, a subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California.' Extra
precautions were taken to minimize environmental impacts because
the mill was to be built near an important source of surface water
for desert wildlife and over a major aquifer."0 This concern for
the environment, however, evaporated with the end of the uranium
boom. In the final analysis, there has been significant environmental
degradation at the site.'
The Sweetwater mill began operations in 1980 and ceased
operations when it was placed on standby in May 1983.' ° During
this period, milling produced 2.2 million cubic yards of tailings.
In 1991 a joint venture which included the Kennecott Uranium
Company, a subsidiary of Kennecott Corporation, purchased the
facility. 5 Kennecott plans to use the Sweetwater mill to process
ore from an underground uranium mine being developed some 25
miles to the north. Kennecott decided that it would be easier to
reactivate Sweetwater's existing milling permit than to construct and
permit a new mill.'
The Sweetwater mill is located in the Red Desert in an isolated
part of Sweetwater County in southwestern Wyoming. The area in
which the mine and mill complex were built includes critical win-
"" URANIUM RECOVERY FIELD OFFICE, NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN
CONSIDERATION OF THE RENEWAL OF SOURCE MATERIAL LICENSE SUA-1350 FOR
SWEETWATER URANIUM PROJECT I (Mar. 24, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9204130224). See also infra notes 413-417 and accompanying text.
a' See infra notes 407-411 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 436-444 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Letter from Rick Engelmann, District Engineer, Wyo. DEQ, to Houston
Snyder, Minerals Exploration Co. at 1 (Apr. 7, 1981) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ)
(confirming that the mill was operating in 1980); URANIUM RECOVERY FIELD OFFICE,
supra note 400, at 1.
'" Sweetwater Uranium Mine, Minerals Exploration Co., Annual Mining and
Reclamation Report at F-I (Nov. 1, 1978) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ). In 1985
the GAO reported that the Minerals Exploration mill site contained 3.5 million metric
tons of tailings. Joint Hearing, supra note 47, at 197.
4" URANIUM RECOVERY FIELD OFFICE, supra note 400, at I.
' Hugh Jackson, Joint Venture Proposes Green Mountain Underground U-Mine,
CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Aug. 25, 1992, at Al, A10.
[VOL. 1 1: 1
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS
tering grounds for one of Wyoming's largest antelope herds." It
is also an important source of water and habitat for birds and other
desert wildlife. "' The Chain Lakes are located nearby and a Class
I aquifer underlies the mining complex. One high ranking state
environmental official said that the water in the basin "was some of
the best in the state of Wyoming."41 In discussing the importance
and fragility of this water resource, a state hydrologist explained in
the early 1980s that
its Class I status reflects its potential use in a water poor region. It
is that potential use that the operator must protect .... There are
no hard numbers of the cost of restoring the aquifer, once contam-
ination has occurred. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that such
restoration can be achieved."'
The decision in the late 1970s to open a uranium mine and mill
in this area of important wildlife habitat was opposed by numerous
environmental groups. These groups threatened legal action and the
Union Oil Company received considerable negative publicity over
the issue."2 The legal challenge was withdrawn only after the
NRC required that mill tailings be stored partially below ground and
after the company agreed to negotiate with the protesting environ-
mental groups."3 The end result was a mine and mill complex
' See Letter from Dale Strickland, Supervisor of Biological Services, Wyo. Game
and Fish Dept., to Gary Beach, Wyo. DEQ (Oct. 16, 1978) (on file with archives, Wyo.
DEQ); Way Clearing for Red Desert Uranium Mine, ROCK SPRINGS DAILY ROCKET-
MINER, Oct. 26, 1978.
' See Robert Waggener, Touring the Red Desert, GREEN RIVER STAR, June 25,
1980, at B3.
9 Memorandum from Chris Lidstone, Hydrologist, Wyo. DEQ, to Gary Beach,
Wyo. AML Supervisor 4 (Sept. 23, 1983) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8310240045);
Memorandum from Dennis Fransway et al., Principal Environmental Analyst, Wyo. DEQ,
to Mark Moxley, Acting Supervisor, Wyo. DEQ, Dist. I1 at 7 (May 25, 1982) (on file
with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
410 State Reconsiders Request for Mine in Red Desert, ROCK SPRINGS DAILY
ROCKET-MINER, June 10, 1978 (quoting Walter C. Ackerman, Director, Land Quality
Division, Wyo. DEQ).
"' Memorandum from Chris Lidstone, supra note 409, at 4.
422 See Paul Krza, Mine May Decide Desert's Future, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept.
21, 1978, at 17; Petition Objecting to Issuance of Mining Permit at 2, In re Mining
Permit Application, Temporary Filing Number 1 I/111, Mineral Exploration Co. v. Wyo.
Outdoor Council et al., Before the Wyo. Environmental Quality Council (Oct. 10, 1978)
(on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
"' Motion to Withdraw Petition Objecting to Issuance of Mining Permit (with
Stipulation of Dismissal), submitted by Josephine Porter, Attorney for Petitioners, Before
the Wyo. Environmental Quality Council (Oct. 26, 1978) (on file with archives, Wyo.
DEQ). See also Krza, supra note 412, at 17.
1995-96]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L.
designed to avoid many of the environmental problems associated
with other uranium operations.
Mill tailings would be deposited in a synthetically lined, par-
tially below ground pit instead of the typical above ground, unlined
pile or pond within a diked area.4"4 Water pumped from the open
pit mine would be treated before it was discharged into the
desert."5 The company would finance studies of how this dis-
charged mine water affected both desert flora and fauna."6 The
impact of pumping the mine pit on water levels in the nearby Chain
Lakes would also be carefully monitored. 7
This was the plan. The reality was quite different, at least as
concerns protection of groundwater. The environmental vigilance
demonstrated when the mill was being built in the late 1970s quick-
ly dissipated in the early 1980s when the health of the industry
became a new major priority at both state and federal levels."'
B. The Tailings Pond Liner Fails
In December 1980, after only months of operation, a 130-foot
seam separation was found in the synthetic tailings pond liner. 9
The state immediately inspected the pond and asked that the area
around the rip be diked off and pumped out.42° The company was
warned that this "could prevent a lot of possible problems which
could result if radioactive water got into the groundwater.""42 Min-
erals Exploration believed that the liner would be further damaged
in the process of constructing the dike and quickly made temporary
repairs.422 In their view, the state had over reacted to a minor inci-
414 S. MIKOL, Wyo. GAME AND FISH REPORT - UNION MINERALS EXPLORATION
COMPANY (May 1, 1980) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ); OFFICE OF RADIATION
PROGRAMS, supra note 22, at 4-35.
' Memorandum from Dennis Fransway et al., supra note 409, at 7-8.
416 Motion to Withdraw Petition, supra note 413, at 5-6; Update: Minerals Explo-
ration, THE CROSSROADS MONITOR (Wyo. Outdoor Council), June-July, 1979, at 8-9.
4' Motion to Withdraw Petition, supra note 413, at 1-5.
,, See generally supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text; Collins, supra note
16, at 495-99, 529-30 (on accomodation to the uranium industry in applying Wyoming's
mine reclamation rules).
4,9 Letter from Houston Snyder, Minerals Exploration Co., to Francis LaBarge,
Water Quality Engineer, Wyo. DEQ at 1 (Jan. 13, 1981) (on file with archives, Wyo.
DEQ).
411 Memorandum to File, Liner Break in Tailings Pond at Minerals Exploration Co.,
from Frank LaBarge, Wyo. DEQ at 2 (Jan. 2, 1981) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
421 Id. at 3.
,2 Letter from Houston Snyder, supra note 419, at 1.
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dent. "Small leaks from this system would/will have an infinitesimal
effect on the environment as compared to other existing uranium
tailings disposal systems now in use in Wyoming."423
By 1983 there were three more incidents where holes or tears
were found in the liner.424 Floating debris and waves were causing
punctures and tears.45 According to NRC, the long-term solution
was a non-erosive shoreline. 26 However, as the mill was closing
because of low uranium prices, NRC accepted temporary. repairs and
planned to re-examine the issue of the liner when the mill re-
opened.4 7
Temporary repairs were not very effective. In 1985 a state
inspection reported that "continued wind and water erosion of the
cell bank has caused these holes to grow. 42 8 The state's earlier
anxiety about groundwater contamination seemed to have disap-
peared. A state inspector noted that Minerals Exploration Company
"is now utilizing a misting system to enhance evaporation of the
tailings liquid. When the liquid level drops below the holes, repairs
will be made to the liner.
4 9
This same nonchalant attitude was apparent in 1986, even
though by then, leakage from past tears had produced a plume of
contaminants underneath the tailings pond.430 In June 1986 the
state reported that "the lower liner is patched as necessary as the
water level decreases. If and when mining operations are resumed
and this cell is used, the liner will need to undergo complete repair.
The plume from the tailings cell is continuing to be monitored." 431
By late fall of 1986 Minerals Exploration had installed wells to
catch the seepage from the pond and pump it back into the tailings
impoundment. 42 The company appeared to be as unconcerned
about the contaminated aquifer as were state regulators. Indeed,
4 1 1 I d . a t 3 .
,2, Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8584, from Gary Konwinski, Project
Manager, Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC Region IV at 2 (Nov. 3, 1983) (on file
with NRCIPRD, ACN. 8312020103).
42 id.
416 Id. at 3.
427 Id.
'' STEVE GARLAND, Wyo. DEQ, ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT, MINERALS EXPLO-
RATION CO. at 3 (Apr. 15, 1985) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
429 id.
410 JANE VALERIUS, Wyo. DEQ, ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT at 2 (June 19, 1986)
(on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
431 id.
411 MINERALS EXPLORATION Co., ANNUAL MINING AND RECLAMATION REPORT,
SWEETWATER URANIUM MINE A-2 (Oct. 31, 1986) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
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Minerals Exploration felt that restoring the aquifer would be rela-
tively easy. "If required, groundwater restoration would consist of
pumping 75 to 400 gallons per minute for three or four years. 433
Total costs for groundwater restoration, based on 42 months of
pumping, 'were estimated by Minerals Exploration to be
$61,600.4' Neither the state nor NRC questioned these estimates
which were used to set the company's bond.435
In 1987 groundwater contamination worsened.'l Yet as late
as 1990 the state was unsure if the cause was still a leaking liner.
According to our files, it is assumed that the tailings impoundment
liner is intact (i.e., does not leak) below the current water level.
However, no documentation of liner integrity could be found....
The condition of the liner material above the current water level
raises concern over the condition below the water level. 37
In 1991 the state estimated that groundwater restoration would re-
quire another four years of pumping.43 In 1992, in their third an-
nual groundwater corrective action review, Minerals Exploration
Company (MEC) stated that they were "unable at this time to esti-
mate the time required to reach compliance. MEC will continue to
pump back and aggressively mitigate the remaining contamina-
tion." '439
Kennecott, the new owner, must now deal with a major con-
tamination problem. In 1991 over 16 million gallons of water were
pumped from the aquifer, thus removing 750,000 pounds of hazard-
ous constituents.'  Despite this herculean effort, uranium concen-
43 Id. at F-7.
434 Id.
435 See, e.g., JACK SMITH, WYo. DEQ, ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT, MINERALS
EXPLORATION CO. at 1, 2 (May 23, 1988) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ). But cf.
Letter from Mark Moxley, District 11 Supervisor, Land Quality Division, Wyo. DEQ to
Oscar Paulson, Facility Supervisor, Minerals Exploration Co. attachment at 2 (Feb. 11,
1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9103190036) (where the state questions estimates
of reclamation costs and time).
'3 Memorandum to File, Minerals Exploration Co., from Steve Ingle, Hydrologist,
Wyo. DEQ 3 (Feb. 5, 1988) (on file with archives, Wyo. DEQ).
," Letter from Doug Gilmer, Environmental Senior Analyst, Wyo. DEQ, to Ramon
Hall, Director, NRC Uranium Recovery Field Office, Region IV 2 (Mar. 6, 1990) (on
file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9005100090).
' Memorandum to File, supra note 435, attach. at 2.
Letter from George Worman, Radiation Safety Officer, Minerals Exploration Co.,
to Ramon Hall, Director, NRC, Uranium Recovery Field Office, Region IV attachment 6
(Jan. 24, 1992) (on file with NRCIPDR, DKT. 40-8584).
4 Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-8584, from Joel Grimm, Project Manager,
NRC Region IV at 1 (Sept 3, 1992) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9209180088).
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trations remained one to two orders of magnitude above the ground-
water protection standard. Total dissolved solids occurred as high as
six times the standard. In addition, lead-210 and radium routinely
exceeded the groundwater standard."' NRC's conclusion was that
"no significant change has occurred in the groundwater quality
during the period of record." 2
In a 1995 review of their groundwater corrective action pro-
gram Kennecott was optimistic about a new pump that would in-
crease the amount of water removed from the aquifer to 18.5 mil-
lion gallons per year."3 Again, Kennecott was unable to estimate
the time required to reach compliance. The NRC was assured, how-
ever, as in the past, that Kennecott would continue to pump back
and aggressively mitigate the remaining contamination. '
The Sweetwater uranium mill is one of the newest in the Unit-
ed States. It was one of the last mills built before the uranium mar-
ket crashed. In the late 1970s when the mill was built there was a
new emphasis on protecting the environment. Yet, today, the situa-
tion at the Sweetwater mill is not much different from that found at
older mills: seepage contaminated an important aquifer; regulators
allowed this situation to deteriorate in the 1980s; and attempts to re-
store the aquifer indicate the task will be difficult. However, there is
one difference. The new operator, Kennecott Uranium Company, is
preparing to re-open the mill as soon as the uranium market im-
proves. In a plan resonant with the promise of the late 1970s,
Kennecott is proposing to build a new state of the art tailings im-
poundment at the site to be used when milling resumes." 5
XI. CASE 8: THE ATLAS CORPORATION'S MILL, MOAB, UTAH
A. Introduction
The Atlas uranium mill located just outside of Moab, Utah, is a
fitting final case study. It allows a review of each of the major
problems associated with the implementation of UMTRCA. These
44 Id. at 2.
442 id.
4 Kennecott Uranium Co., Sweetwater Facility, Annual Program Review 2 (Jan.
26, 1995) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9502070219).
4" Id. at 5.
"' See Kennecott Uranium Co., Response to NRC Comments Conceptual Design
Tailings Management Study 1 passim (Jan. 18, 1995) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9501310256).
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problems include serious groundwater contamination from leaking
tailings, exacerbated in the 1980s by regulatory neglect; airborne
particulates and excessive radon emissions near a populated area;
the threat of future floods endangering the tailings impoundment; a
company in financial difficulties facing possible bankruptcy; and
inadequate financial guaranties to ensure reclamation.
The Atlas tailings impoundment and mill are located on the
north bank of the Colorado River, upstream from the town of Moab.
The tailings impoundment, at one point, is as close as 750 feet to
the Colorado River.' New businesses serving tourists are rapidly
moving north of Moab, along the Colorado River, toward the tail-
ings pile." The Moab area has become a mecca for mountain bik-
ers, four wheelers, and river rafters. The town is also the major
center for motels and restaurants serving visitors to two nearby
national parks, Arches and Canyonlands.' 4
The mill has been owned by Atlas since 1962. For many years
the company discharged mill wastes into the Colorado River."9
Beginning in 1977 tailings were placed in a single impoundment
constructed from coarse tailings.'50 During operations, tailings
were discharged from multiple spigots around the perimeter of a
starter dam. The coarse sand was deposited around the edges to
create the impoundment, with the fine sand and solution being
placed toward the center.4"' When operations ceased in 1984 the
impoundment contained 9.6 million metric tons of tailings.5 2 To-
day these tailings, which are located next to the partially dismantled
mill, cover 130 acres and stand over 100 feet high a short distance
from the Colorado River.453
SOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. Nuc. REG.
Comm., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEENT RELATED TO RECLAMATION OF THE
URANIUM MILL TAILINGS AT ATLAS SITE, MOAB, UTAH 3-19 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter
ATLAS DRAFT. E.I.S.].
Personal observation, March 1994. See also ATLAS DRAFT E.I.S., supra note
446, at 3-11, 3-12.
In 1994 discussions about the Atlas tailings, the State of Utah noted that the
population in the vicinity of the tailings rises from 4,000 to around 20,000 people during
tourist season. The State also pointed out that there are 1.2 million visitors annually to
the nearby national parks. Division of Radiation Control, Utah Dept. of Envtl. Quality,
Atlas EIS Public Scoping Written Comments 4 (May 12, 1994) (on file with author).
4 FINAL GENERIC E.I.S., supra note 73, at T-8; OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS,
supra note 22, at 4-24.
4'0 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 22, at 4-24.
45 id.
452 Joint Hearing, supra note 47, at 197.
413 Reclamation of Atlas Corporation's Uranium Mill Facility at Moab, UT, 59 Fed.
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Atlas, a Denver corporation, has in recent years been active in
gold mining in Nevada. In early 1993, it suffered major losses due
to low gold prices and operational problems.45 In the fall of 1993
the company was rescued in an $8.4 million stock deal by Phoenix
Financial Holdings, Inc. of Toronto, Canada.4" At this time, Atlas
agreed to turn over control of its board to these Canadian inves-
tors. 6
B. Tailings Seeping into the Groundwater and the Colorado River
The Atlas mill stopped operations in March 1984. Atlas' li-
cense to process uranium expired soon afterward. The NRC denied
an application to renew the operating license because of Atlas'
failure to meet bonding requirements.4" In July 1987 Atlas was
ordered to begin decommissioning the mill and to decontaminate
and reclaim the site. 5
In 1988 the NRC determined that hazardous constituents in the
groundwater adjacent to the tailings pile exceeded protection stan-
dards for chromium, molybdenum, nickel, radium, selenium, urani-
um, and vanadium.459 Uranium concentrations exceeded the EPA
groundwater protection limit by as much as 918 times.' In re-
sponse to this contamination Atlas produced a groundwater correc-
tive action plan.46' In this plan the company proposed that natural
dissipation be allowed to remove the plume of hazardous constitu-
ents which had formed in the groundwater next to the tailings.46
Essentially, Atlas proposed that contaminated groundwater dissipate
Reg. 14,912, 14,913 (1994).
4' Atlas Corp. President Resigns Amid Crisis: Stock Plunges $ 2.25, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 1993, at B10.
" Atlas Corp. Turns Control of Company over to Canadians, WALL. ST. J., Sept.
7, 1993, at AS.
4% Id.
'0' EPA ASSESSMENT OF URANiuM MILL TAILING PILES at 1 (Oct. 1991) (on file
with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-91-67).
458 Id.
4" Memorandum for Docket File No. 40-3453, from Gary Konwinski, Program
Manager, NRC Region IV 1 (June 22, 1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN.
9007160255).
' Division of Radiation Control, Utah Dept. of Envtl. Quality, Comments Address-
ing the NRC's Proposal to Amend Source Material License SUA-917, Atlas Corporation
Moab Mill at 1 (Aug. 19, 1993) (on file with author).
' Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-3453, supra note 459, at 1.
Id.; Letter from Edward Hawkins, Branch Chief, Uranium Recovery Field Office,
NRC Region IV, to Atlas Minerals Corporation 1 (Apr. 12, 1989) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 8905170015).
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by draining into the Colorado River. Atlas' position was that seep-
age into the river would be diluted by the volume of water in the
Colorado River. 3 The company emphasized that, because of dilu-
tion, seepage from the tailings created no measurable impact on
downstream water quality.'
The NRC rejected Atlas' proposal for a clean-up by natural
dissipation. The NRC estimated that it would take 75 years for the
tailings to drain sufficiently to reach nondetectable levels in the
groundwater next to the mill.' 5 According to the NRC this was
"not a corrective action program, but rather an application for Alter-
nate Concentration Limits."' Atlas was told that "considering nat-
ural dilution as a corrective action program is not an option at this
site, or any other tailings impoundment." 7 A corrective action
program "must incorporate the concepts of removing or treating
hazardous constituents in place. '
Despite such resolute words, the groundwater contamination
problem at this site has not proved easy to resolve. With NRC's
guidance, Atlas produced a new clean-up plan. This plan had as its
objective de-watering the tailings. The goal was to stop seepage
from entering the groundwater and the Colorado River. This would
be accomplished by drying out the tailings, the source of the con-
taminated seepage.9
NRC had already required Atlas to stop watering the tailings.
Atlas had used water to control blowing tailings and limit radon
emissions and Atlas objected strenuously when made to stop this
practice.47 The company also agreed to expand the sprinkler mist-
46 See Letter from Richard Blubaugh, Vice Pres., Regulatory and Envtl. Affairs,
Atlas Corp., to Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, attachment no. 2 at 1, 2 (Nov. 3,
1989) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 8911070353); Memorandum for Docket File No.
40-3453, from Gary Konwinski, Project Manager, NRC Region IV 2 (Feb. 28, 1991) (on
file with NRCIPDR, ACN. 9103130349).
'" See Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-3453, supra note 463, at 2. The State
of Utah has strongly objected to this conclusion. "What this 'dilution is the solution to
pollution' analysis fails to make clear is that while technically surface water quality
standards may not be violated, there will still be a contaminant mass flow into the Colo-
rado River that does incrementally degrade the river, even though this is difficult to
measure." Division of Radiation Control, supra note 460, at 2.
See Letter from Edward Hawkins, supra note 462, at 1.
46 Id.
47 id.
'" Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-3453, supra note 459, at 1.
69 Id. at 1-2.
'-t Atlas asserted "that it was far more protective of the environment and the public
health to continue pumping water into the tailings, so as to minimize air concentrations
of Radon-222 and airborne particulates, than to discontinue this practice to address an
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ing system to accelerate evaporation from the surface of the tailings.
In addition, the company would drill new wells around the base of
the tailings pile so that liquids could be pumped directly from the
impoundment.471 The goal was to pump seepage from the tailings
pile at a rate of 10 gpm, treat it, and evaporate it.472 However, the
wells drilled for this purpose never produced as expected. In July
1990 Atlas estimated that the combined yield of 10 pumping wells
was 3 to 4 gpm, and falling.473
Atlas did not hide its displeasure at the groundwater clean-up
plan that had been imposed by the NRC.
We estimate a cost of $25,000 to $35,000 per gpm of solution
recovered. This estimate does not include power, maintenance, or
administrative costs. This is an unreasonable cost for Atlas to
incur for an impractical approach to a situation that presents no
significant risk to the environment or human health.474
Atlas' frustration increased when, in late 1989, they received a
Notice of Violation and a fine of $6,250 for excessive radon-222
concentrations in an unrestricted area.475 Atlas responded by point-
ing out that "NRC's rigid insistence upon the dewatering of tailings
has now resulted in the predicted increase in airborne radon-222
concentrations.
NRC has had no other ideas for resolving the groundwater
contamination problem. In a letter responding to Atlas' complaints,
the NRC seemed to have concluded, as Atlas had earlier, that the
only answer to the problem was to accept higher levels of hazardous
constituents in the groundwater. Atlas was told that "the pumping
data and costs associated with well installation will be helpful in
demonstrating that hazardous constituents have been reduced to
levels as low as reasonably achievable."477 Although Atlas would
have to continue pumping liquid from the tailings, the NRC did
insignificant hydrological issue." Letter from Richard Blubaugh, supra note 463, attach.
no. 2 at 1, 2.
4" Letter from Richard Blubaugh, Vice Pres., Regulatory and Evntl. Affairs, Atlas
Corp., to Ramon Hall, Director, Uranium Recovery Field Office, NRC Region IV 2, 3
(July 18, 1990) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN. 9009050037).
472 Memorandum to Docket File No. 40-3453, supra note 459, at 2.
472 Letter from Richard Blubaugh, supra note 471, at 1.
414 Id. at 3.
"7 See Letter from Richard Blubaugh, supra note 463, at 1 passim.
47 Id. at attach, no. 2 at 2.
¢" Letter from L.A. Yandell, NRC Region IV, to Atlas Corporation 1 (Aug. 23,
1990) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9009040108).
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suggest that Atlas eventually might wish to pursue an application for
Alternate Concentration Limits.
478
C. Move the Tailings
The citizens of the booming tourist community of Moab do
have a plan for dealing with the Atlas tailings. They want the tail-
ings moved away from the Colorado River and away from the tour-
ist center. Local politicians, businesses, environmentalists, and even
state officials support the idea of moving the tailings.' 7 These crit-
ics argue that in addition to the problem of contaminants entering
the Colorado River and the dangers from blowing tailings, there is a
real possibility of the pile being breached by floods.' The Atlas
tailings sit in both the flood plain of the Colorado River and the
path of Moab Wash, an ephemeral stream which runs along the
northeast end of the pile." The Colorado River can rise to the
bottom of the tailings impoundment during spring high water.2
About half of the approximately twenty uranium mill tailings
piles now being reclaimed by the Department of Energy, under Title
I of UMTRCA, will be moved at taxpayers' expense to more isolat-
ed and stable sites."3 Two alternative sites have been identified for
the Atlas tailings. One site is in a box canyon 7 miles distant, and
the other is near the airport 15 miles away.' Advocates of the
' Id. It is not clear why in 1992 NRC accepted and published in the Federal
Register a date of Dec. 1998 as the estimated date for successful completion of ground-
water corrective actions at the Moab tailings site. See Atlas Corp., Moab Mill, Recla-
mation Schedules, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,541, 29,542 (1992). See also 59 Fed. Reg. 30,814
(1994) (extending the projected completion date to Dec. 1999). As the State of Utah
noted, if this Dec. 1998 date "involves the potential use of alternate concentration limits
(ACLs), this should be made clear." Division of Radiation Control, supra note 460, at 1,
2.
" See, e.g., Sam Taylor, NRC Decision on Tailings Has Locals up in Arms, THE
TIMES-INDEPENDENT (Moab, Utah), July 29, 1993, at Al, A4; Adrien Taylor, Gov.
Leavitt Joins Chorus of Critics Opposed to Atlas Tailings Capping Plan, THE TIMES-
INDEPENDENT (Moab, Utah), Sept. 2, 1993, at Al; Division of Radiation Control, supra
note 460, at 1 passim; Division of Radiation Control, supra note 448, at 1 passim.
' Lance Christie, Cleaning Up the Atlas Uranium Mill Tailings (paid "public infor-
mation report"), THE TIMES-INDEPENDENT (Moab, Utah), July 29, 1993, at A3.
," See Division of Radiation Control, supra note 460, at 8; Reclamation of Atlas
Corporation's Uranium Mill Facility, supra note 453, at 14,912, 14,913.
4 Christie, supra note 480, at A3; ATLAS DRAFr E.I.S., supra note 446, at 3-18,
4-13.
43 See 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 8-4; OFFICE OF
ENVTL. RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ANNUAL
STATUS REPORT ON THE URANIUM MILL TAILINGS REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM at A-3
(Dec. 1992).
' Reclamation of Atlas Corporation's Uranium Mill Facility, supra note 453, at
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move argue that reclaiming the tailings in place fails almost every
test set forth in federal regulations, including remoteness from popu-
lated areas; ability to isolate contaminants from groundwater; and
minimization of erosion and dispersion of the tailings by natural
forces.4 5
In July 1993 the NRC issued a finding that the reclamation of
the Atlas tailings in place "would not have a significant impact on
the environment."' In what has become almost a routine proced-
ure, similar Findings of No Significant Impact (FONSIs) have been
issued for private mills, some of which face possible damage from
future flooding.4 7 What was not routine was the political furor
that erupted in Moab after the Finding of No Significant Impact was
issued.' An unusually broad coalition of business interests, envi-
ronmentalists, and the State of Utah opposed the NRC decision.4 9
As a result of this protest the NRC withdrew the FONSI4 ° and
subsequently announced that it would produce an Environmental
Impact Statement to assess the necessity for moving the Atlas tail-
ings.
49 1
The President of Atlas responded to the possibility of having to
move the tailings by threatening bankruptcy. 4' He warned that if
14,912, 14,913. The site near the airport is analyzed in detail in ATLAS DRAFT E.I.S.,
supra note 446, at 2-14 to 2-22.
" See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. The main argument against mov-
ing the tailings is increased costs. The cost of reclaiming the tailings where they lie is
estimated to be $13 million to $16 million. Moving the tailings is estimated to cost $94
million to $114 million. ATLAS DRAFT E.I.S., supra note 446, at xxi, 2-33, 5-1 to 5-6.
Cost is one factor that the NRC must consider in making reclamation decisions. See
supra note 92. However, the mandate to consider costs also applies to the Title I sites
being reclaimed by the Dept. of Energy, half of which will be moved. 42 U.S.C. §
2022(a) (1988). See also 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 8-2, 8-3.
4 Atlas Mineral Corp., 58 Fed. Reg. 38,796, 38,797 (1993).
See, e.g., Finding of No Significant Impact, supra note 175 at 39,584
(Homestake); Finding of No Significant Impact, supra note 269, at 33,285 (Western
Nuclear, Inc.).
' See, e.g., Sam Taylor, supra note 479, at Al, A4; County Council Blasts NRC
Plan on Dealing with Atlas Tailings Pile, THE TIMES-INDEPENDENT (Moab, Utah), Aug.
19, 1993, at Al, A3.
4 See supra note 479 and accompanying text.
o Atlas Corporation, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,516 (1993); Adrien Taylor. NRC to Withdraw
Earlier Position on Atlas Tailings under Pressure, Hatch Says, THE TIMES-INDEPENDENT
(Moab, Utah), Sept. 30, 1993, at Al.
" Reclamation of Atlas Corporation's Uranium Mill Facility, supra note 453, at
14,912.
' Video tape of Civic Dialogue's Moab Town Meeting, broadcast by KUED (Salt
Lake City) (Feb. 22, 1994) (on file with author), see generally Tailings May Bankrupt
Atlas ENR, Mar. 28, 1994, at 21.
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NRC decided for removal the financially troubled company would
cease to exist. "The tailings pond will become a Superfund site that
will cost hundreds of millions of dollars to reclaim."493 This threat
was premature. In its 1996 Draft Environmental Impact Statement
on the Atlas site, the NRC recommended against moving the tail-
ings.""' NRC essentially agreed with Atlas that the volume of wa-
ter in the Colorado River diluted seepage from the tailings pile.
"[W]ater quality downstream from the tailings pile does not differ
measurably from that upstream of the pile.""49
The worst case scenario analyzed in the Draft E.I.S. was a
failure of the reclaimed tailings pile during a flood. NRC hypothe-
sized that 20% of the pile, or about 2 million tons of tailings, would
enter the Colorado River in such a failure.' 9 Even in this worst
case, the NRC concluded that most water quality standards in the
river (uranium being the exception) would not be violated during a
pile failure because of the great dilution provided by the flood.'
The report did note that "although the immediate effects of a maxi-
mum pile failure are forecast to last only several days, the percep-
tion of the region's safety and desirability for Colorado River-based
recreational experience could be noticeably diminished, no matter
what the actual safety factor might be."'49
I
The regulations implementing UMTRCA provide a clear means for dealing with
such threats. Companies are required to put up a bond, cash deposit, or similar financial
security to insure reclamation if the company defaults. See supra notes 100-101 and
accompanying text. Since at least 1990, Atlas's required surety has only been $6.5 mil-
lion. Letter from Ramon Hall, Director, UFRO, NRC Region IV, to Richard Blubaugh,
Atlas Corporation at 1 and attach. at 10 (Dec. 13, 1990) (on file with NRCIPDR, ACN.
9101090124). However, since 1992 the NRC has been able to count promised federal
Title X monies in determining the sufficiency of a company's surety. See supra notes
367-372 and accompanying text.
"3 Videotape of Civic Dialogue's Moab Town Meeting, supra note 492. See also,
Tailings May Bankrupt Atlas, supra note 492.
'4 ATLAS DRAFT E.I.S., supra note 446, at xxi, 2-26.
' Id. at 4-22. Possible exceptions include suspended solids, pH, manganese, and
gross alpha. However, the Draft E.I.S. argues that given the relatively high concentrations
of contaminants already found in the Colorado River, the tailings contribute only trivial
percentages of most contaminants. Id. at 4-22 to 4-27.
The Draft E.I.S. does admit that the groundwater at the tailings pile will continue
to be impacted, after reclamation, by periodic Colorado River flooding and rewetting of
the tailings. This contamination of the groundwater will continue until the entire
leachable content of the pile is leached out. However, "[b]ecause groundwater on the
Atlas side of the river is not used for any purpose, the continued contamination associat-
ed with the tailings would not impact groundwater use." Id. at 4-13, 4-14.
'9 Id. at xvii, 4-8, 4-9, 4-27, 4-55.
4' Id. at 4-8.
4m Id. at 4-55.
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XI1. THE END OF DELAY
In October 1991 the EPA announced an agreement with the
NRC to set enforceable deadlines for reclamation of non-operational
uranium mill tailings impoundments.4' Uranium milling compa-
nies would no longer be allowed to delay reclamation or to deter-
mine the pace at which reclamation would occur. "Milestones" or
enforceable deadlines would be set for each phase of reclama-
tion.5" EPA's stated goal was to have a permanent cover in place
over all non-operational tailings impoundments by December 31,
1997.0 Deadlines were also set for groundwater restoration.
5°2
But, as seen in the eight case studies, these deadlines for ground-
water cleanup varied widely and, in some cases, were overly opti-
mistic. Companies were warned that if they refused to voluntarily
cooperate in establishing reclamation deadlines, then the NRC
would "impose the appropriate license amendments by or-
der.... 503
The impetus for the government's new concern with rapid
reclamation came from a number of successful suits by environmen-
tal groups in the 1980s."°4 The subject of these suits was not
UMTRCA, but rather EPA's failure to enforce section 112 of the
Clean Air Act."5 In the last year of the Carter Administration EPA
added radionuclides to the list of section 112 hazardous air pollut-
ants that it was responsible for regulating.5" This listing raised the
'"9 Memorandum of Understanding between EPA and NRC, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,434,
55,435 (1991) [hereinafter Memorandum]. See also Health and Environmental Standards
for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings: Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,340, 60,340-356
(1993) [hereinafter Final Rule]; Uranium Mill Tailings Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,220,
28,220-231 (1994).
' See Memorandum, supra note 499, at 55,434-435; Final Rule, supra note 499, at
60,346, 60,352.
'o' Memorandum, supra note 499, at 55,435.
'n See Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,346; Uranium Mill Tailings Regulations,
supra note 499, at 28,227.
o Memorandum, supra note 499, at 55,434.
' See infra notes 513-517 and accompanying text.
' 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988) (superceded 1990).
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,738
(1979). After the official listing of radionuclides as an air pollutant, the EPA was re-
quired to set emission standards for major sources of the pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §
7412(b)(1)(B) (1988). These major sources would include some sources that were also
licensed by the NRC, such as uranium mills, uranium fuel cycle facilities, and nuclear
power plants. Other sources of radionuclide emissions, not licensed by the NRC, include
hospitals, uranium mines, research facilities, coal-fired fossil burners, elemental phospho-
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specter of direct regulation by two federal agencies for those sources
of radionuclides that were also licensed by the NRC.
However, the anti-regulation forces that took over the EPA in
the early days of the Reagan Administration were reluctant to begin
any direct regulation of radionuclidestfl The EPA developed vari-
ous subterfuges to avoid this dual regulation. The Agency argued
that regulating radionuclides was impossible because of their com-
plexity,' and that additional time was needed to study the prob-
lem, perhaps as much as nine years.' 9 The EPA also ignored Con-
gressional deadlines. For some emission sources, the EPA did issue
proposed standards, but no final standards followed.10 Other pro-
posed standards were issued and then withdrawn.' In the case of
uranium mill tailings, the EPA declared that new standards for re-
claimed tailings were not necessary as the standards promulgated
under UMTRCA also satisfied section 112 of the Clean Air Act.
12
Environmental groups challenged this and other Clean Air Act deci-
sions of the Reagan Administration. 13 The most important of sev-
eral court victories for these environmental groups came in 1987 in
a key case that dealt with EPA emission standards for vinyl chlo-
ride.
514
Vinyl chloride was listed as a hazardous air pollutant under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, as were radionuclides. In the Vinyl
Chloride decision, the court found that section 112 required the
EPA to set basic emission standards without considering factors
rous plants and phosphogypsum stacks. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 66, at 107-
09.
09 See Goldsmith, supra note 66, at 109-113, 120, 131; John D. Graham, The
Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens under Section 112
of the Clear Air Act, 17 LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REV. 399, 412-13 (1986). In addition
to the antiregulatory stance of the Reagan administration, Dwyer emphasizes the EPA's
reluctance to implement health based standards that it felt were unrealistic, costly, and
never intended by Congress to be taken literally. John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Sym-
bolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 277-81 (1990).
Monson, supra note 17, at 570.
Goldsmith, supra note 66, at 110.
10 Id. at 109-113. See also Graham, supra note 507, at 412-13.
s" See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Radionuclides;
Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,654, 51,658 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 NESHAPS].
512 Standards Licensed Sites, supra note 20, at 45,939-940. See also Health and
Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings: Proposed Rule, 58 Fed.
Reg. 32,174, 32,183 (1993).
s' See 1989 NESHAPS, supra note 511, at 51,658; Dwyer, supra note 507, at 269-
71; Collins, supra note 16, at 508-09.
11 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Vinyl Chloride].
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such as cost and technological feasibility. 15 An "acceptable" or
"safe" risk level for the hazardous pollutant, the court found, must
first be determined using health criteria alone.' 16 The uranium in-
dustry was obviously apprehensive about a radon emission limit that
initially would be set using only health criteria. As if to confirm the
companies' worst fears, environmental groups argued after the Vinyl
Chloride decision that the EPA should set a zero emission level for
air pollutants, such as radionuclides, for which there is no known
safe threshold level.1
The Vinyl Chloride decision forced the EPA to withdraw past
emission standards issued under section 112 of the Clean Air Act.
Now there would be new standards that would probably be more
stringent and EPA would administer these standards directly. In
December 1989, the EPA promulgated new standards for controlling
radon emissions from uranium mill tailings."' Surprisingly these
new standards retained the previous emission level for reclaimed
tailings of 20 pCi/m2/s.5 9 What was new, and for the uranium in-
dustry most upsetting, were the new regulations for unreclaimed
tailings impoundments. Companies with tailings impoundments
either on stand-by (waiting for market conditions to improve) or
operational and still receiving tailings also would have to meet the
20 pCi/m2/s standard." This rule, the EPA noted, "will have the
I Id. at 1146, 1163, 1165.
516 Id. at 1165. After this inital step, the EPA could then consider technological and
cost factors in adjusting the standard to assure it provided "an ample margin of safety."
Id. at 1152, 1165. See also Gary E. Marchant & Dawn P. Danzeisen, Comment, "Ac-
ceptable" Risk for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 535, 538-39
(1989); Alan J. Goldberg, Note, Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants
under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 641-43 (1988); Mark
W. Ciaravella, Note, Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants under Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 15 ENERGY L.J. 485, 485-87 (1994).
"' Marchant & Danzeisen, supra note 516. The Natural Resources Defense Council
had argued for a zero-emission standard in Vinyl Chloride. Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at
1152. However, in explaining its later rulemaking the EPA emphasized that the court did
not require a finding that "safe" means "risk-free." The court said that EPA itself must
decide what risks are acceptable in the world in which we live. They cited driving a car
or breathing city air as risk-laden activities that society does not consider unsafe. 1989
NESHAPS, supra note 511, at 51,684-85.
s" 1989 NESHAPS, supra note 511, at 51,654. See also Collins, supra note 16, at
510-12.
"' 1989 NESHAPS, supra note 511, at 51,683, 51,702 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
61.222 (1990)). For the first time companies were required to monitor to assure that this
emission standard was achieved. Under UMTRCA, the 20 pCi/m
2/s limit was assumed to
be achieved once an acceptable reclamation plan had been implemented. Id. at 51,683,
51,709-11.
520 Id. at 51,680 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.252(a) (1990)).
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practical effect of requiring the mill operators to keep their piles wet
or covered."52'
This action led to another ruling even more objectionable to the
industry. Wetting tailings to lower radon emissions could increase
seepage and groundwater pollution. Therefore, EPA decided to
eliminate the liner exemption granted in 1983 to existing unlined
tailings impoundments.522 Unlined tailings impoundments could no
longer be considered operational.523 Equally, if a tailings impound-
ment were full, or the mill it served dismantled, then it, too, would
be considered non-operational.524 The final blow was that these
non-operational tailings impoundments were given a two year recla-
mation deadline."
As the majority of uranium mill tailings piles were unlined,
these regulations meant that the EPA was closing down most of
what remained of the conventional uranium milling industry. Al-
though it was understood that most companies could not reclaim in
two years, the deadline was a wake up call for rapid reclamation.
The American Mining Congress (AMC) indignantly labeled the new
20 pCi/m2/s emission standard for operating impoundments "arbi-
trary and capricious. ''""s The new liner requirement was called "il-
legal and infeasible."527 The AMC stated with prescience that, "as
a practical matter, the liner requirement will require the closure of
the Homestake, Quivira, and Pathfinder mill tailings sites. '
... Id. Indeed, this was the point of the new standard, since "the risks from mill
tailings piles can increase dramatically if they are allowed to dry and remain uncovered."
Id.
5n Id. (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.252(c) (1990)). See also Collins, supra note 16,
at 511-12.
'23 1989 NESHAPS, supra note 511, at 51,702 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.221(b)
(1990)).
524 Id.
" Id. However, "[i]f the two year period is not enough time for these piles to dry
out and be covered and disposed of then EPA is prepared to develop expeditious com-
pliance schedules in consultation with the affected parties .. " Id. at 51,683.
" Petition of the American Mining Congress for Reconsideration and Stay of
Radionuclides NESHAPs, Before the U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency 25 (Feb. 13, 1990)
(on file with EPA Air Docket, Docket No. A-79-11).
I. Id. at 27.
12 Id. at 28. This was to prove true. Companies with unlined tailings impound-
ments that had maintained an operational status were soon pressured to begin reclama-
tion. For example, Homestake was threatened with a fine of up to $25,000 a day for
being out of compliance with EPA regulations. Letter from A. Stanley Meiburg, EPA
Region 6, to David Crouch, Homestake Mining Co. 1, 2 (Dec. 10, 1990) (on file with
NRC/PDR, ACN. 9101150178). Quivira was told unless they began reclaiming their
unlined #2 tailings impoundment it would be considered in non-compliance with EPA
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Implementation of the new standards became muddied in 1990
with the intervention of Congress. After one failed attempt by
Wyoming's Senator Simpson to nullify EPA's rules, a weaker ver-
sion was enacted. This addition to the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 gave EPA the possibility of eliminating dual regulation for
those radionuclide sources that were also licensed by the NRC.529
If the EPA Administrator determined, by rule, that the NRC regula-
tory program "provides an ample margin of safety to protect the
public health," then EPA would not have to promulgate stan-
dards. 3
In 1991, the EPA announced that it planned to rescind the
Clean Air Act regulations it had issued in 1989 for non-operational
uranium mill tailings impoundments.5 3' However, EPA emphasized
that this rescission would take place only after UMTRCA's regula-
tions incorporated the goal of rapid reclamation and enforceable
deadlines.532 Clearly EPA realized that if UMTRCA did not in fact
achieve the same purpose as the rescinded regulations, then the EPA
would again be challenged by the environmental groups who had
sued successfully in the past.
In an effort to avoid further unproductive litigation, EPA devel-
oped a consensus approach for new rule making. The agency held
direct discussions with all the concerned parties: environmental
groups, the uranium industry, and the NRC.533 Groups representing
industry and the environment signed a "settlement agreement" in
1993."3' The parties agreed to avoid the delays and expense of fu-
regulations. See Letter from John Hepola, EPA Region 6, to Bill Ferdinand, Rio Algom
Mining Corp. 2 (Jan. 18, 1991) (on file with NRC/PDR, ACN. 9102280029).
The decision of these mills to close rather than build new lined impoundments
probably was made easier by the continued fall in uranium prices in the early 1990s.
9 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 112(d)(9), 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1993). See generally Collins, supra note 16, at 513-15; Gold-
smith, supra note 66, at 121-24, 138-41, 144-52.
... 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. 1993).
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,432 (1991) [hereinafter Proposed Rulemaking]. See also
Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,342. The standards to be rescinded are found at 40
C.F.R. part 61, subpart T.
532 Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 531, at 55,433. See also Final Rule, supra
note 499, at 60,342, 60,346.
... Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,345.
134 Proposed Settlement; Uranium Mill Tailings Disposal Litigation, 58 Fed.Reg.
17,230 (1993). See also Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,345, 60,350. NRC did not
sign the agreement, but stated its agreement in principle. Uranium Mill Tailings Regula-
tions, supra note 496, at 28,225.
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ture legal action and to get on with the business of reclamation."'
The settlement agreement gave victories to both industry and envi-
ronmentalists. The uranium industry got rid of an unrealistic two
year reclamation deadline, and saw the end of onerous dual federal
regulation.536 The price paid to the environmental litigants for ac-
cepting the rescission was the assurance that radon emissions would
be permanently and quickly controlled. NRC now includes enforce-
able interim deadlines in its licenses.537 These enforceable "mile-
stones" move companies toward the goal of a permanent cover over
all nonoperational tailings impoundments by the end of 1997."3'
CONCLUSION
Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act,
which regulated reclamation in the private uranium industry, was
clearly the wrong law for the times. Soon after the law was passed,
newly elected Republicans brought an end to ten years of federal
environmental activism. The economic prospects of the uranium
industry also changed dramatically in this period. In 1978 Congress
had planned to protect the public health with new below grade,
lined, tailings impoundments. These impoundments would be prop-
erly sited to guard against floods, earthquakes, and erosion by wind
and rain. However, after the uranium market crashed in 1980, no
new tailings impoundments were built. Instead of supervising new
construction, federal and state regulators found that their main task
was to supervise the burial of an industry. UMTRCA was not writ-
ten with this economic future in mind.
Administrators and politicians who oversaw the implementation
of UMTRCA made adjustments to fit the changed economic and
... Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,345.
" Uranium mills also were given the possibility of extending an interim deadline if
the 20 pCi/m2/s emission level was being met. Final Rule, supra note 499 at 60,347;
Uranium Mill Tailings Regulations, supra note 499, at 28,223-224, 28,227. In addition,
companies could continue to use a portion of existing impoundments to receive in-situ
mining wastes and other similar waste from outside sources. These outside wastes would
be carefully monitored by NRC. Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,347-348; Uranium
Mill Tailings Regulations, supra note 499, at 28,224, 28,228.
Finally, an objectionable emission monitoring requirement was clarified. Companies
would only have to do a one-time verification on their permanent cover to assure that
emission levels were no greater than 20 pCi/m2 /s, when averaged over the impoundment.
Uranium Mill Tailings Regulations, supra note 499, at 28,222.
... Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,352.




political climate. Given the sympathy that existed for the stricken
uranium industry and the general pro-industry climate in Washing-
ton in the 1980s, it is not surprising that these adjustments favored
the uranium industry. The new directions taken in implementing
UMTRCA were an odd mixture of federal intervention and non-
intervention. The non-intervention took the form of a lenient attitude
about when reclamation would begin and with what speed it would
proceed.539 In addition, regulations that seemed to require the relo-
cation of tailings, if their long term safety could not be guaranteed,
were loosely interpreted so as to avoid having to move tailings piles
being reclaimed by private industry.
There was also an interventionist aspect to the attempts to
make the law fit the times. In 1992 Congress transferred the finan-
cial burden for reclaiming 55 million metric tons of tailings from
private industry to the federal taxpayer.5" The federal government
promised to reimburse private companies for the costs of reclaiming
that portion of their tailings that had been produced under federal
contract.
In the late 1980s, as a result of court decisions on earlier suits
by environmental groups, the pendulum began to swing back toward
a more literal and stringent interpretation of UMTRCA. The NRC
has been forced to embrace expeditious reclamation, at least as
concerns covering the tailings. Most companies now will be re-
quired to have a permanent cover over their tailings by the end of
1997.541
It is, however, still too early to conclude that some equitable
balance has been struck between relief for a dying industry and
reasonable reclamation requirements. The other major dispensation
from the rules given these private companies will not be rescinded.
Private companies will not be forced to pay for moving tailings to
more protected sites. In contrast, about half of the more than twenty
Title I abandoned tailings sites being reclaimed by the Department
... One often overlooked benefit from delaying reclamation is that companies could
use the delay to pay for future reclamation. Monies that otherwise would have been
spent on reclamation could be invested, and the interest compounded. As a hearing offi-
cer noted in making this point to a representative from Homestake Mining Co. "Twenty
million dollars not spent, or used alternatively, is going to earn you money. . . . A year
delayed is a year of money used and if I present your $20 million, it makes a million
bucks .. " Public Hearings, supra note 130, at 125 (statement of Mr. Bunger).
See supra notes 361-369 and accompanying text.
' Final Rule, supra note 499, at 60,346, 60,352. See also Uranium Mill Tailings
Regulations, supra note 499, at 28,220-226.
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of Energy are being moved.54 When the government pays for the
move, the question of costs seems to be less of an issue.
The main reason it is still too early to make a final assessment
of UMTRCA, Title II, is that we do not know what NRC will do
about groundwater restoration. So far the signals are very mixed. By
the late 1980s NRC was finally requiring all companies to initiate
groundwater corrective action plans. Yet, the NRC also accepted,
and published in the Federal Register, incredibly unrealistic comple-
tion dates for some of the most difficult groundwater clean-up prob-
lems.543 In addition, in Wyoming, the NRC has required only min-
imal bonds to cover groundwater restoration.'" The problem of
groundwater contamination was greatly exacerbated by NRC's lais-
sez faire approach to reclamation in the 1980s. This problem is
more intractable than the problem of radon, and possibly a greater
future danger to health and the environment. Yet, during the late
1990s, the NRC could literally write off the groundwater contami-
nation problem with a liberal granting of eased clean-up standards in
the form of Alternate Concentration Limits.
If most companies are allowed to complete reclamation without
restoring contaminated groundwater, then, in the most egregious
cases, UMTRCA, Title H, will have achieved little more than pro-
tection against the questionable hazard of outdoor radon emissions.
Polluted groundwater would remain and, in some cases, reclaimed
tailings piles could be infiltrated and dispersed by future floods.
On the other hand, NRC may insist companies follow the ex-
ample of Pathfinder, Homestake, and Quivira, and undertake a seri-
ous effort to restore polluted groundwater. In this best case scenario,
NRC could still grant eased standards in the form of Alternate Con-
centration Limits. However, these standards would be limited to
those rare situations where polluted groundwater had little potential
for being used, or for migrating to other aquifers. Eased standards
might also be appropriate where a long term and innovative
remediation effort had apparently achieved all it could. This would
appear to be what the regulations for Alternate Concentration Limits
require today.5 45 It will be several years, however, before we can
assess NRC's resoluteness in enforcing these regulations.
54 See 2 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 28, at 8-4; OFFICE OF
ENVTL. RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 483, at A-3.
U3 See, e.g., supra notes 213, 306 and accompanying text, and notes 350 and 478.
5" See supra notes 301-305, 346-351, 434-444 and accompanying text.
5" See supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
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